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The Fernald Feed Materials Production Center, located 18 miles northwest of downtown 
Cincinnati, Ohio, refined and produced uranium products for the American nuclear weapons 
program from 1951 to 1989. In the course of its Cold War mission, Fernald polluted the 
surrounding countryside and was responsible for increased illnesses among workers and nearby 
residents. Using a case study approach based largely on archival materials, this thesis places 
Fernald within the Cold War context, explains the creation of the uranium production system in 
the United States, and explores the conflict between Cold War production goals and protection of 
health and the environment. Despite its critical importance to nuclear weapons production, 
Fernald has received scant attention from Cold War or environmental historians. While the 
Fernald site has been remediated into a green space, medical studies have found elevated rates of 
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In 1980, Richard Heatherton retired from a career with the United States Department of 
Energy that spanned four decades. Beginning in the late 1940s as an industrial hygienist with the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Heatherton worked within the Health and Safety Division to 
determine the amount of radiation workers were receiving on the job.1 Twenty years after 
retiring as the director of health and safety at the Fernald Feed Materials Production Center, 
Heatherton reflected on his experiences in an interview with USA Today: “The purpose was 
production… Health and safety was not the chief purpose of these [operations].”2 Heatherton’s 
words captured the impossibility and irony of his task. American nuclear weapons production 
was motivated by Cold War tensions and an arms race with the Soviet Union. The facilities that 
made up the atomic weapons complex were devoted to the singular task of weapons production. 
Yet, the AEC maintained a health and safety division and employed people like Heatherton to 
ensure that its workers were safe and that damage to the surrounding environment was kept to a 
minimum. As Heatherton’s own reports and recollections indicate, however, this was not the 
legacy of the American nuclear weapons program.3 Instead, the historical record shows that the 
AEC and Department of Energy (DOE) knowingly and willingly sacrificed worker safety and 
environmental cleanliness in favour of weapons production. This thesis traces that history 
through two generations of uranium refining facilities, with an emphasis on the Fernald Feed 
Materials Production Center outside of Cincinnati, Ohio. This case study demonstrates how the 
                                                          
1 Richard C. Heatherton, “Radiation, Radon, and Dust Survey of Operations Essential to the Storage of K-65 in the 
Tower,” November 27, 1950, Box 12, Series 27, Record Group 326, NARA, Atlanta. 
2 Peter Eisler, “Toxic Exposure Kept Secret,” USA Today, 2000. 





AEC and its contractors prioritized the production of nuclear weapons while neglecting the 
environmental and biological harm caused by the refining of uranium during the Cold War. 
The lack of a coherent national pollution policy in the United States before 1970 
contributed to the negative environmental and health consequences at plants like Fernald which 
were unexplored until the 1980s. Despite established departments and regulations within the 
AEC, the uranium production system polluted the local water, soil, and air across the continental 
United States and beyond. Untethered by federal regulation and pressured by Cold War tensions, 
uranium refineries were free to negotiate pollution policy with local regulators. Before the 
establishment of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, individual 
American states often invested the powers of pollution regulation within their state boards of 
health. Since existing environmental legislation was relatively weak in the first half of the 20th 
century, environmental regulators often turned to negotiations with the polluter to establish 
acceptable pollution limits.4 As the Fernald case demonstrates, the AEC and DOE exploited the 
weak regulatory powers of the state boards of health and used their own strong classification 
powers to maintain high production levels of uranium and to hide pollution from local 
populations.5  
 As a result of rapid progress in physics research during the 1930s, and the onset of the 
Second World War, the United States began a crash program to produce an atomic bomb in 
1942.6 Physicists around the world had concluded that the creation of an atomic bomb was 
                                                          
4 Martin V. Melosi, Effluent America: Cities, Industry, Energy, and the Environment (University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2000), 64-66 
5 “Report of Ground Contamination Study Committee,” 30 September 1962, Box 5, Series 27, Record Group 326, 
NARA, Atlanta, 20-21. 
6 Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Volume 





theoretically possible, but the United States did not have the industrial capacity to produce one. 
Before the onset of the war, uranium was usually treated as a waste product of radium mining 
and plutonium simply did not exist in nature. Uranium oxide was processed on a small scale by a 
handful of American factories to create glazes for ceramics and pigments for glassware, and pure 
uranium metal was used a few grams at a time in the nation’s universities.7 Scientists quickly 
deduced that, instead of micrograms distilled in laboratories, the Manhattan Project would 
require kilograms of pure uranium produced in refineries. When asked about the feasibility of the 
project, the pre-eminent physicist Niels Bohr remarked that the United States would have to 
become “one huge factory.”8 By 1945, this characterization was accurate. Manhattan Project 
administrators created a transnational system of no less than ten major factories in the United 
States that together took uranium ore from Canada and the Belgian Congo and transformed it 
into the most powerful weapons ever created. 
 During the Manhattan Project, the chemical process by which uranium ore was processed 
into highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium was a complex, multi-step operation 
involving several intermediate products.  Black oxide (triuranium octoxide, U3O8) was the first 
product in the supply chain, the result of a refining process that separated uranium from other 
impurities found in the ore. Black oxide was produced at Port Hope, Ontario, by Eldorado 
Mining and Refining, and at the Linde Air Products factory in Tonawanda, New York. Black 
oxide was shipped from Ontario and New York to the DuPont Deepwater Works in Deepwater, 
New Jersey, and the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works (MCW) in St. Louis, Missouri. At Deepwater 
and MCW, black oxide was converted first to orange oxide (uranium trioxide, UO3), and then to 
                                                          
7 Robert Bothwell, Eldorado: Canada’s National Uranium Company (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 
81. 
8 John M. Findlay and Bruce Hevly, Atomic Frontier Days: Hanford and the American West (Seattle: University of 





brown oxide (uranium dioxide, UO2). At this point, brown oxide was shipped to the Harshaw 
Chemical plant in Cleveland, Ohio, to be converted into green salt (uranium tetrafluoride, UF4). 
The Harshaw plant, after 1944, subsequently processed green salt into uranium hexafluoride 
(UF6), the direct feed material for the uranium enrichment processes at the Oak Ridge facility in 
Tennessee. In a separate stream, the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works and the Electro-Metallurgical 
company plant in Niagara Falls, NY, produced pure uranium metal from a magnesium reduction 
process. This uranium metal was then shipped to the Hanford Works in Washington State to 
produce plutonium.9 
 This system did not cease operations with the end of the Second World War. While there 
was some uncertainty surrounding the future of nuclear weapons immediately after the conflict, 
the rise of Cold War tensions encouraged the United States to pursue an aggressive expansion of 
nuclear weapons production. In February 1946, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the American 
Embassy in Moscow, George Kennan, authored the famous “Long Telegram” to the American 
State Department in Washington. One of Kennan’s central arguments within the telegram was 
that the leaders of the Soviet Union were not motivated by logic and thus Soviet aggression 
could only be contained with a sufficient military threat from the United States.10 Harry Truman 
reflected these arguments in 1947 when he appeared before Congress to request $400 million 
dollars in military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey.11  Whereas the U.S. had been 
                                                          
9 Manhattan District History, Book VII, Volume 1, secs. S9-S13. 
10 The telegram arrived at a time of heightened tensions between the Soviet Union and the US and was widely 
circulated among American government officials. Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the 
Cold War, 1945-1950 (Princeton: NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 141. 
11 Turkey, at the time, was being pressured by the Soviet Union to relinquish control of the straits between the 
Mediterranean and the Black Seas. Greece was in the midst of a civil war, with a strong communist movement. 
Senior American officials argued that without support from the United States, both Greece and Turkey would fall 






producing a handful of nuclear weapons each year until 1948, the production schedule quickly 
increased to hundreds, and then thousands of nuclear weapons per year.12 With the end of the 
American nuclear monopoly in 1949, American production of nuclear weapons became critically 
important to the U.S. containment strategy.13 
With the increase in production came the increase in demand for uranium. The discovery 
of massive deposits of uranium in Ontario, northern Saskatchewan, and the western United 
States coincided with a construction boom in uranium processing facilities.14 The Atomic Energy 
Commission built two uranium refineries at Weldon Spring, Missouri, and Fernald, Ohio, two 
uranium enrichment facilities at Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio, a bomb core factory 
at Rocky Flats, Colorado, and a weapons assembly plant at Pantex, Texas.  Replacing all of the 
temporary factories operated during the war by 1955, these new facilities consolidated fissile 
materials production, and reflected the shift from the slow production of several prototype 
weapons per year to the mass production of ready-to-use models during the 1950s. As a result of 
the increase in both recoverable uranium deposits and the facilities to process them, the U.S. 
increased its stockpile from 1,169 warheads in 1953 to 22,229 in 1961. Only a year later, during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, the American arsenal numbered some 25,500 nuclear weapons.15 
In the 1950s, people living in northern Saskatchewan probably felt as if they had little in 
common with the citizens of the Marshall Islands. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine two climates 
and landmasses less alike. Yet, Canadians occupying the frigid subarctic and Marshall Islanders 
                                                          
12 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2013,” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 69, no. 5 (September 1, 2013): fig. 2, 78. 
13 Michael D. Gordin, Red Cloud At Dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the End of the Atomic Monopoly (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 22–23. 
14 T.E. Murray et al., “Fourteenth Semi-Annual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission,” July 1953, NNSA/NSO 
Nuclear Testing Archive, https://www.osti.gov/opennet/detail.jsp?osti-id=16360377, 1–11. 





residing on sun-soaked atolls both lived at either end of the American nuclear weapons 
production chain.16 The production of thousands of nuclear weapons required uranium mines, 
refineries, enrichment plants, nuclear reactors, chemical separation plants, metal fabrication 
plants, weapons design laboratories, and testing sites. While the American government 
constructed much of this infrastructure, it also relied heavily on the private sector in the first ten 
years of the atomic weapons program. Established industrial facilities concentrated in the eastern 
United States joined remote uranium mines and newly-established atomic cities to form the 
world’s first nuclear weapons production system.  
Across the production system, processing, refining, and manufacturing processes at 
various facilities caused environmental damage and poisoned people’s bodies. By the end of the 
Cold War, American efforts to produce nuclear weapons had produced 24 million cubic meters 
of radioactive waste, as well as 1.5 billion cubic meters of contaminated water, and 73 million 
cubic meters of contaminated soil.17 Health data, while less exact, still paints a grim picture. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has conducted six 
radioactive dosage reconstruction projects, each detailing a separate nuclear weapons facility. 
The CDC estimates that there will be 11,000 fatal cases of cancer in the United States as a direct 
                                                          
16 Although this thesis initially uses the terms “production chain” and “production complex” interchangeably to refer 
to the physical sites that produced atomic weapons, “production complex” is a more expansive term that includes 
national laboratories and testing sites in addition to uranium mining and refining sites. Later on, the thesis adopts the 
term “production system” to reflect a more dynamic understanding of those same sites. “Production system” is a 
more inclusive term that acknowledges the multitude of actors and interests that worked together to produce atomic 
weapons during the Cold War. 
17 This does not include some 143,848 cubic meters of radioactive soil and debris from Enewetak Atoll, nor 500 tons 
of radioactive debris and an unknown amount of radioactive soil from Bikini Atoll now stored at Runit Island. See 





result of nuclear testing.18 Dose reconstruction projects at other sites are less conclusive, and 
often leave residents and workers wanting for information that is more concrete.19 
 
Figure 1.1 Principle Uranium Refineries in the Eastern United States and Canada by 1944 
Author: Steven Langlois, Historical GIS Lab, 2018 
 
 
                                                          
18 Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, National Cancer Institute, “Report on the 
Health Consequences to the American Population from Nuclear Weapons Tests Conducted by the United States and 
Other Nations,” May 2005, 4. 






Figure 1.2 American Nuclear Weapons Production Complex, 1 January 1945 






 Beginning with the first publicly available report on the Manhattan Project in 1945, the 
Smyth Report, most scholarly publications regarding the production of atomic weapons focused 
on the role of scientists.20 Using major scientific breakthroughs to drive the narrative, historians 
concentrated on particular scientists and wrote about their laboratories and their relationship with 
Washington. Rebecca Schwartz argues in her 2008 Ph. D. dissertation that the Smyth Report had 
a lasting impact in the historiography and influenced historians to write about the creation of the 
atomic bomb as a particularly scientific endeavour.21 This is not to say, however, that scholars 
ignored other aspects of nuclear weapons. Historians such as Martin Sherwin and Gregg Herken 
discuss the atomic bomb in conjunction with larger themes such as war and international 
diplomacy.22 Richard Hewlett and Jack Holl’s official history of the AEC recognizes that, at least 
for a period of time, the primary function of the agency was to produce fissionable materials for 
the manufacture of nuclear weapons,23 something that required more industrial might than 
scientific brilliance. Still, Hewlett’s and Holl’s volumes are guided by the administrative 
narrative of the AEC, intersecting where applicable with the political, scientific, economic, and 
diplomatic aspects of atomic bombs.  
Due to several factors, nuclear historians began to shift their focus in the 1990s. After 
five decades of intense secrecy, Department of Energy Secretary O’Leary began a policy of 
openness in response to revelations of human plutonium experiments during the Cold War. A 
series of scandals at nuclear facilities, the end of the Cold War, and a general heightened 
                                                          
20 Henry DeWolf Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945). 
21 Rebecca Press Schwartz, “The Making of the History of the Atomic Bomb: Henry DeWolf Smyth and the 
Historiography of the Manhattan Project” (Princeton University, 2008), iii. 
22 Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and Its Legacies (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); 
Herken, The Winning Weapon. 
23 Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy 





sensitivity to environmental damage resulted in a turn towards an understanding of nuclear 
facilities and sites in terms of legacy. In 1997, Peter Bacon Hales published Atomic Spaces: 
Living on the Manhattan Project. Hales looks at the social, spatial, and environmental 
dimensions of the Manhattan Project and encourages scholars to view the non-military aspects of 
atomic bomb production. John M. Findlay and Bruce Hevly advanced the historiography further 
in 2011 with Atomic Frontier Days: Hanford and the American West. In this book, Findlay and 
Hevly examine the cultural connection between Hanford and the wider American West. Kate 
Brown’s celebrated Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great Soviet and 
American Plutonium Disasters was published only two years later. Detailing the environmental 
and biological harm wrought by the American and Soviet plutonium factories, Brown’s work is 
characterized by careful research and powerful narrative. In 2016, Martha Smith-Norris 
published Domination and Resistance: The United States and the Marshall Islands during the 
Cold War. Examining the impact of American nuclear weapons testing on the Marshallese, and 
the ways in which they organised to resist such treatment, this monograph expands the 
historiography to include remote testing sites in the larger atomic production system. 24 
Histories from the last twenty years are thus different from earlier scholarship in terms of 
scope and focus. Whereas the first generation of nuclear historians were interested in explaining 
how and why the United States built and used nuclear weapons, the current generation is more 
focused on the legacy of that production, especially in local or regional contexts. While earlier 
histories were told on a national scale, the latest monographs are often written about a single 
                                                          
24 Peter Bacon Hales, Atomic Spaces: Living on the Manhattan Project (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997); 
Findlay and Hevly, Atomic Frontier Days; Kate Brown, Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great 
Soviet and American Plutonium Disasters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Martha Smith-Norris, 
Domination and Resistance: The United States and the Marshall Islands During the Cold War (Honolulu: 





facility or site in the nuclear supply chain. As a result of this shift, historians have paid much 
closer attention to the environmental and health consequences that developed locally at each 
AEC facility. This thesis builds upon the recent historiographical developments by exploring the 
health and environmental consequences of the Fernald Feed Materials Production Center and its 
relationship to the Cold War.  
Michael Silverman’s 2000 dissertation, “No Immediate Risk” provides a nuanced 
framework for understanding nuclear weapons production in the United States. Instead of 
referring to the collection of mines, factories, laboratories, and testing sites as a “nuclear 
weapons complex,” Silverman argues that this collection is much better understood as a nuclear 
weapons production system. He makes a strong case that the atomic production system was not 
as monolithic and dominant as former historians have suggested. Instead, the nuclear weapons 
production system is better understood as a federation, including multiple groups of diverse 
actors, both inside and outside of the system itself. Silverman uses this framework to explore 
ideas of environmental safety and acceptable risk within the production system.25 Influenced by 
Silverman’s framework, this thesis explores the ways in which different historical actors inside 
and outside the atomic production system understood environmental damage and medical harm. 
My core research questions include: what role did the Fernald refinery play in the U.S. nuclear 
weapons production system? What were the medical and environmental impacts of uranium 
refining at the Fernald plant during the Cold War? What was the local community’s response to 
Fernald’s history of pollution and radioactive contamination? 
                                                          
25 Michael Joshua Silverman, “No Immediate Risk:  Environmental Safety in Nuclear Weapons Production, 1942–





 This project makes use of archival collections, both digitized and physical, that contain 
documents for the period 1942 to 1963. The Atlanta branch of the American National Archives 
and Records Administration holds many of the records from the Oak Ridge Operations Office 
(OROO). The OROO was the headquarters for the Feed Materials Division of the Atomic 
Energy Commission, the particular division in charge of refining uranium into “feed materials” 
for the plutonium and enriched uranium plants. This rich collection of documents forms the 
evidentiary basis of this thesis. Documents in this collection highlight the general history of the 
uranium production complex, and the decisions that were made by the people in charge of it. In 
the Atlanta archives, I found documents that support my argument that the administrators of the 
AEC knew how quickly uranium polluted the surrounding environment and how they repeatedly 
failed to seriously address this problem.  
In addition, there are several digitized collections that contain relevant sources. As a 
result of the ongoing declassification and environmental cleanup of nuclear sites, the DOE26 
maintains two websites which host collections of digitized and declassified sources. The DOE’s 
SciTech Connect website27 and OpenNet website28 contain different sets of documents. SciTech 
Connect, which is more focused on scientific papers and reports, contains material which is 
useful for understanding the technical aspects of the nuclear facilities as well as the scientific 
challenges faced in the refinement of uranium.29 The DOE OpenNet website contains a 
                                                          
26 The Department of Energy took over the administration of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1977. As a result, 
they currently have stewardship of the American nuclear stockpile and the facilities that produced materials for the 
American nuclear weapons program. 
27 Department of Energy, Office of Scientific and Technical Information: SciTech Connect, 
https://www.osti.gov/scitech/ 
28 Department of Energy, Office of Scientific and Technical Information: OpenNet System, 
https://www.osti.gov/opennet/ 
29 History Associates Incorporated, “History of the Production Complex: The Methods of Site Selection,” 1987, 
https://www.osti.gov/scitech/servlets/purl/5745137; J. I. Hoffman, “Purification of Uranium Oxide,” 1942,  
https://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/4432713-purification-uranium-oxide; P. P. Alexander, “The Production of 





bibliographic reference to every DOE document declassified after 1994, in addition to hundreds 
of thousands of digitized copies. OpenNet also provides access to the Manhattan District 
History, a text-searchable pdf file, comprised of seven volumes of formerly classified documents 
and reports summarizing the entire Manhattan Project. It was also through OpenNet that I gained 
access to a copy of Linking Legacies, a 1997 report that details the waste produced from nuclear 
weapons manufacturing at sites like Fernald.30 
Finally, this thesis draws from the Cincinnati Enquirer and the Fernald Living History 
Project. Articles in the Enquirer provide a good overview of the initial public reaction to the 
construction of Fernald in 1951 as well as the reaction of residents as uranium pollution became 
publicly known in the 1980s. The Living History Project is a series of in-person interviews 
recorded beginning in 1997 by the Fernald Community Alliance. The project contains over 130 
separate interviews with former employees, local residents, and key players in the lawsuits and 
cleanup operations at Fernald. This source is especially useful because it allows access to the 
recollections of workers and residents, including their perception of health and environmental 
risks. Through the oral interviews and newspaper articles, it is clear that certain residents felt 
angry and frustrated with the Department of Energy after the contamination at Fernald became a 
national media story in the mid 1980s.31 
In terms of scope, this study examines the nuclear weapons supply chain which ran from 
uranium mines in Saskatchewan, Ontario, and the Northwest Territories to Fernald, Ohio. While 
                                                          
https://doi.org/10.2172/1026498.https://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/1026498-production-uranium-metal-metal-
hydrides-incorporated. 
30 U.S. Department of Energy, Linking Legacies. Unfortunately, these archives contain little documentation between 
the early 1960s and the early 1980s. There are very few documents dating from after 1963 in any of the archives I 
searched, especially at the National Archives branch in Atlanta. 






previous works focused on the large Los Alamos, Hanford, and Oak Ridge production sites, this 
thesis concentrates on the Fernald site, which has been neglected by historians. Department of 
Energy reports suggest that facilities that have received the most scholarly attention –like 
Hanford– are also the ones that were the heaviest polluters.32 However, radioactive pollution was 
prevalent throughout the uranium supply chain, and scholars have begun to explore what 
possible harms it has caused. For example, David Elijah Bell and Marissa Zappora Bell recently 
explored the tension between perceived and reported radiological damage in Port Hope, 
Ontario.33 Further, Fernald, and to a lesser extent Port Hope, were subject to national news 
coverage beginning in the late 1980s.34  
 By focusing on the uranium refineries needed to produce atomic weapons, this thesis 
expands on the environmental themes present in recent scholarship. Uranium was the raw 
resource needed for every nuclear weapon built in the United States. Tightly controlled by the 
American government, the vast majority of imported and domestic uranium supplies from 1943 
to 1963 were funneled into U.S. atomic weapons production. The complex system of uranium 
refineries, enrichment plants, and plutonium factories that made weapons production possible 
irradiated the landscapes and peoples surrounding them. Rooted in the discipline of history, this 
thesis builds upon current scholarship by examining the Fernald Feed Materials Production 
Center and exploring the environmental and health consequences of uranium refining. 
                                                          
32 U.S. Department of Energy, Linking Legacies, 62, table 3-8. 
33 David Elijah Bell and Marissa Zappora Bell, “Port Hope Burning: The Trail of Eldorado, the Uranium Medical 
Research Centre, and Community Tension over Scientific Uncertainty,” in Nuclear Portraits: Communities, The 
Environment, and Public Policy, ed. Laurel Sefton MacDowell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017). 
34 Kenneth B. Noble, “U.S., for Decades, Let Uranium Leak at Weapon Plant,” The New York Times, October 15, 
1988; Ed Magnuson, “They Lied to Us: Unsafe, Aging U.S. Weapons Plants Are Stirring Fear and Disillusion,” 
Time, October 31, 1988; Martin Mittelstaedt, “Town’s Residents Test Positive for Uranium Contamination,” The 
Globe and Mail, November 13, 2007, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/towns-residents-test-
positive-for-uranium-contamination/article18149068/; Robert Mackenzie, “How Loyalist College Is Helping with a 






Throughout this thesis, I critically analyze the decisions and actions of the AEC leadership and 
their industrial contractors and highlight how their decisions contributed to the contamination at 






































Chapter 1: The Origins of the Uranium Production Complex, 1942-1952 
 
 
“…the average person couldn't have imagined digging some raw ore out of somewhere in Africa, 
…digging it out of the ground, bringing it over here, processing it and ending up with metal 
uranium at the end product, …and then this metal uranium somehow is going to lead to atomic 
bombs.”1 Loyd Smith, local resident and former Fernald worker, May 1999 
 
In 1955, Elton Britt recorded “Uranium Fever,” a song about leaving his regular day job 
to adopt the life of a uranium prospector. The song was recorded at the time that the demand for 
atomic weapons caused uranium to flow from remote mines in Canada and the United States into 
the heartland of American industry. The American drive for nuclear supremacy during the Cold 
War necessitated the ability to source and refine large amounts of uranium. As a result, the 
various agencies and officials responsible for atomic bomb production from the mid-1940s to the 
mid-1960s constructed and maintained a series of uranium refineries: the first step of the larger 
nuclear weapons production complex. Not restricted to the United States, the demand for 
uranium affected Canadian mining companies and successive Canadian governments in addition 
to the American Army Corps of Engineers and the Atomic Energy Commission. Increasingly 
determined to produce an atomic bomb, and later to produce an arsenal of weapons, these 
organizations worked together across an international border to ensure a steady and plentiful 
supply of uranium. In doing so, however, they ignored reports of environmental damage and 
sacrificed worker safety. This first chapter analyses the origins of the uranium production 
system, beginning with the Manhattan Project and ending with the first successful test of a 
hydrogen bomb in 1952. 
                                                          





The material origins of the world’s first nuclear weapons pre-dated the Manhattan 
Project. There is roughly as much uranium in the earth’s crust as there is tin. However, because 
of the reactivity of uranium, it is rarely found in rich deposits suitable for economic extraction.2 
The uranium ore that eventually became the cores of Little Boy and Fat Man was brought to the 
surface as a result of the world-wide appetite for radium. At the beginning of the First World 
War, radium was in high demand and very expensive: roughly $100,000 a gram.3 With this price 
point, it was profitable for prospectors and mining companies to seek out pitchblende deposits in 
remote and difficult to reach locations.4  Towards the end of the First World War, a radium mine 
was dug by the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) at Shinkolobwe in the Belgian Congo. 
This was followed by a mine dug by Eldorado Mining and Refining at Port Radium in the 
Canadian Northwest Territories in 1932.5 These mines were dug to extract pitchblende, which 
was then refined for its radium content. While the uranium content of these ores was much 
higher than the radium content, there was simply no substantial market for uranium, especially 
one that could be considered profitable from such remote mines. As a result, UMHK and 
Eldorado focused on radium production, and treated uranium as a by-product.  
The combined output of the Port Radium and Shinkolobwe mines lowered radium prices 
on the global market and encouraged the development of refining capacity for radium ore. 
UMHK had operated a radium refinery for Shinkolobwe ores since the early 1920s in Olen, 
Belgium. By 1933, Eldorado had opened a refinery in Port Hope, Ontario. In its first year of 
operation, the Eldorado refinery produced three grams of radium and 35,000 pounds of various 
                                                          
2 Charles D. Harrington and Archie E. Ruehle, eds., Uranium Production Technology (Princeton: NJ: D. Van 
Nostrand Company, 1959), 1. 
3 Bothwell, Eldorado, 7. All dollar figures from Eldorado are contemporary and in U.S. dollars. 
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uranium oxides. At the same time as yields increased in Port Hope, global radium prices fell. In 
1932, radium traded hands for $70,000 a gram. By 1937, the price had fallen to $25,000 a gram. 
That same year, Eldorado produced 24 grams of radium. Despite a virtual monopoly on global 
radium production and the formation of an official cartel to enforce it, the radium refineries at 
Port Hope and Olen were in danger. By 1939, Eldorado was in financial straits. While Eldorado 
had great success in finding, developing, mining, and refining pitchblende ore, it was not enough 
to prevent the closure of Port Radium in 1940. On the other side of the Atlantic, the invasion and 
swift collapse of Belgium by Nazi Germany in May 1940 removed its production from Allied 
control. 6  
Fortunately for Eldorado, the same actions which caused the end of Belgian radium 
production inspired the actions behind the eventual resurrection of Port Radium. Throughout the 
1930s, physicists had been busy studying the nature of atomic particles. In particular, they began 
to turn their attention to whether or not an atom could be split to produce energy. In 1938, Otto 
Hahn and Fritz Strassmann conducted an experiment that confirmed that the uranium atom could 
be split by neutrons.7 Nuclear fission was now a physical reality. The announcement of this 
scientific advancement set off a flurry of both academic publications and scholarly speculation 
regarding nuclear fission and its potential use. In particular, émigré scientists living in the United 
States and the United Kingdom feared that Nazi Germany might be working on an atomic bomb, 
even as the feasibility of such a weapon was intensely debated. Physicists were sufficiently 
concerned that within six weeks of Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, Leo 
Szilard wrote a letter to President Roosevelt, signed by Albert Einstein, which urged the United 
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States to begin an atomic bomb program, and warned of the possibility of Germany’s progress in 
this field. Soon afterwards, FDR directed members of his administration to create an ad-hoc 
uranium committee to explore the feasibility of an atomic bomb.8   
The Uranium Committee achieved little. The next major developments in atomic bomb 
research came instead from scientists working in the United Kingdom. By April 1940, Otto 
Frisch and Rudolf Peierls had concluded that major steps towards atom bomb development were 
theoretically feasible, including a means of detonation, the separation of uranium-235 from 
uranium-238, and radiation problems that might result from detonation. Most importantly, 
Peierls and Frisch argued that the amount of uranium-235 required for a bomb was much less 
than previously thought, perhaps roughly 25 pounds.9 Their report, known as the Frisch-Peierls 
Memorandum, was impressive enough to convince the British government to divert increased 
resources to atomic bomb research.  
By the spring of 1941, the British equivalent of the American Uranium Committee had 
concluded that if enough uranium-235 or plutonium were available, it would be possible to 
construct an incredibly powerful, yet relatively lightweight, atomic bomb within two years.10 
Known as the MAUD Committee Report, this information did not reach the Americans until July 
1941. Once it did, it quickly resulted in changes to the American atomic research effort. In 
October 1941, the Uranium Committee was replaced with the S-1 Committee –officially 
“Section-1” of the Office of Scientific Research and Development– staffed with scientists and 
administrators from the highest levels of government:  President of the Carnegie Institution 
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Vannevar Bush, President of Harvard University James B. Conant, Secretary of War Henry L. 
Stimson, Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, and Vice President Henry A. Wallace.11 In 
this sense, the idea of an atomic bomb had gone from the most obscure possibility in 1938 to a 
viable research project overseen by the nation’s senior officials in 1941. 
For all the excitement that the MAUD Committee report injected into the American 
research efforts, the S-1 Committee had done little in terms of actually building a bomb. That 
task fell to General Groves and the Army Corps of Engineers. In March 1942, President 
Roosevelt approved Bush’s recommendation that development should be turned over to the War 
Department. By October, Conant was confident that the theoretical phase of atomic research was 
over, and that it was simply a matter of development, solving technical problems, and time.12 
Time, of course, was one resource that the S-1 Committee believed to be in very short supply. 
Many of the physicists had thus far concluded that it would take approximately two years to 
build an atomic bomb. If this was the case, then the United States had precious little time to 
waste, lest the Germans complete a bomb first. By the end of 1942, two major decisions were 
made with regards to atomic bomb production. First, the S-1 Committee decided to put its 
resources behind all five viable fission production methods.13 Second, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers took control of the administration of atomic bomb production. Commanded by the 
engineer who had just overseen the construction of the Pentagon, General Leslie Groves, direct 
Army control of the atomic bomb project marked a shift towards the construction of factories 
and the production of fissile materials. The Manhattan Project had officially begun. 
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Despite the rapid developments in atomic research, the companies which were mining, 
refining, and ultimately using radium and uranium had had relatively little contact with the 
American bomb project. Although the New York Times announced the discovery of nuclear 
fission in February of 1939,14 the radium companies were pre-occupied with falling profits and a 
looming international crisis. Indeed, the beginning of the Second World War proved disastrous 
for Eldorado and Union Minière. In Eldorado’s case, the announcement of war in 1939 and the 
success of Hitler’s armies in 1940 removed many customers in continental Europe from the 
market place and ensured that what customers remained in Canada and the UK had turned their 
resources to a total war economy. Profits dramatically fell from 1938 to 1940.15 For UMHK, the 
closure of their refinery should have been the end of their business. However, UMHK had the 
foresight to ship stocks of uranium compounds to ports in the United States and Great Britain 
before the outbreak of hostilities. For Eldorado too, the problem was not a lack of materials. 
Executives estimated they had enough uranium ore in 1940 to cover sales for the next five years 
and subsequently chose to shut down the mine at Port Radium.16 It seemed as if there was an 
over-supply of uranium at the beginning of the Second World War. 
To actually construct atomic bombs, however, required a completely new scale of 
production. To the radium companies, uranium was essentially a waste product. It was many 
times more plentiful than radium in the ores that they mined, but prior to the war the market was 
extremely limited. The only reliable customers of uranium oxides prior to the Second World War 
were ceramics companies, who consumed roughly 150 tons of uranium oxides per year in the 
United States.17 Whereas companies sold radium by the gram and microgram, the engineers and 
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scientists of the Manhattan Project decided that they would need about 1,700 tons of uranium 
oxide (U3O8) by the middle of 1944 to build a bomb. In other words, the Army Corps of 
Engineers would need to, in a period of two years, produce eleven times as much uranium oxide 
as the industry typically used in a year. For this reason, they wasted little time in procuring 
uranium where the capacity already existed. In March 1942, the United States placed the first 
large order for uranium oxide from Eldorado: 60 tons. While this order alone was enough to 
justify the re-opening of the Port Radium mine, the orders continued.18 On July 16, the 
Manhattan Project ordered 350 tons of uranium oxide at $2.05 per pound. Four months later, 
they ordered another 500 tons to be delivered by the end of 1944. These orders not only 
monopolized the production of uranium by Eldorado to the Manhattan Project but also proved 
problematic. Eldorado’s refinery at Port Hope was only capable of producing 150-200 tons of 
oxide each year.19 While Eldorado worked to upgrade their refinery and meet their contracts, the 
Manhattan Project turned to American refineries to pick up the slack. 
In the world of uranium refining during the Manhattan Project, the basic unit of uranium 
was black oxide (U3O8). It was from this oxide that all other uranium products were refined and 
provided a consistent measurement in terms of supply. Whereas uranium ores could vary wildly 
in their purity, and the reduction of uranium oxides to metal could be more or less efficient, the 
amount of uranium in black oxide remained constant. In 1942, there were only two facilities in 
North America which could refine uranium ore into black oxide: the Eldorado refinery, and the 
Vitro Manufacturing Company refinery in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.20 Like the Eldorado 
refinery, the Vitro refinery was originally constructed to refine radium from uranium ores. 
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Sometime prior to the beginning of the Manhattan Project, the Vitro refinery began to specialize 
in uranium products, and produced black oxide and sodium uranate (Na2U2O7). However, 
compared to the Eldorado refinery, the Vitro refinery was quite small. While Eldorado was 
eventually able to process 225 tons of uranium ore per month, Vitro was designed to accept only 
40 tons a month. In addition, the Vitro and Eldorado refineries were more efficient when they 
used high-grade ores of 50 and 20 percent, respectively.21 As a result, the Manhattan Project 
decided to construct a new plant that could efficiently refine low-grade uranium ores. Under a 
cost plus fixed fee contract, the Linde Air Products Company constructed a three-step uranium 
refinery in Tonawanda, New York. Completed in July 1943, the Linde refinery converted 
uranium ore into black oxide, then brown oxide (UO2), and finally green salt (UF4).
22 
Until Linde could come online, however, the administrators of the Manhattan Project still 
needed additional refining capacity. While Eldorado and Vitro could produce black oxide and 
sodium salt, these materials still needed to be further refined to be useful for nuclear fission. In 
late 1942, the Manhattan Project contracted the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works (MCW) to 
construct, at their own expense and as their own property, a uranium refinery at their existing 
chemical works in St. Louis, Missouri. Rather than converting raw ore into black oxide, 
however, MCW accepted the black oxide and sodium salt from Eldorado and Vitro and 
converted it into brown oxide.23 Further, MCW also constructed, for a lump-sum fee, a green salt 
(UF4) and uranium metal plant on adjacent lands rented from the St. Louis Sash and Door 
Works.24 In addition to the complex in St. Louis, Manhattan Project administrators contracted the 
DuPont company to construct a similar uranium refinery at the pre-existing DuPont Chambers 
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Works in Deepwater, New Jersey. The DuPont refinery was similar to Linde and MCW in that it 
produced green salt from black oxide, but it differed in that it also contained a scrap recovery 
plant. Beyond this difference, however, the Linde, MCW, and DuPont refineries operated using 
similar processes and produced roughly identical products. 
By the summer of 1943, the brown oxide/green salt plants were in operation. Green salt 
was a useful intermediate product that could be further processed to produce either pure uranium 
metal or uranium hexafluoride (UF6).
25 By the summer of 1943, there were four uranium metal 
plants in operation in the United States: the two plants at Deepwater and St. Louis, as well as the 
Electro Metallurgical Company plant in Niagara Falls, New York, and a metal plant at Iowa 
State University in Ames, Iowa. While various methods of uranium metal production were 
researched, the most effective method was to reduce green salt with powdered magnesium to 
produce pure uranium metal. This metal was then fed into the X-10 pilot reactor at Oak Ridge 
and later the massive production reactors at the Hanford Engineer Works. The reactors irradiated 
uranium slugs in order to transmute a small fraction of the uranium into plutonium. The 
irradiated slugs were then dissolved in acid to separate the plutonium from the other elements 
present. The final product was a plutonium nitrate solution which was sent to Los Alamos under 
heavy guard.26  
 While there were multiple plants for converting green salt into metal, there was only a 
single plant that the Manhattan Project contracted for the production of uranium hexafluoride. 
The Harshaw Chemical Company’s Brooklyn Works in Cleveland, Ohio contained both a green 
salt plant and a hexafluoride plant by 1944. The hexafluoride plant’s position within the 
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production system was rather important. By 1942, Manhattan Project scientists had deduced that 
the quickest way to produce large amounts of enriched uranium involved the construction of 
enormous facilities to physically separate the fissile uranium 235 isotope from the more plentiful, 
but non-fissile uranium 238 isotope.27 To facilitate the physical separation of these isotopes, 
brown oxide had to be converted into a gaseous compound. Uranium hexafluoride is a solid at 
room temperature but quickly sublimes into a gas at elevated temperatures. Uranium 
hexafluoride is also quite reactive, and incredibly toxic. Despite these challenges, Harshaw 
produced over 1,600 tons of hexafluoride for the mammoth enrichment plants at Oak Ridge by 
1947.28 
In a certain sense, the efforts by the Manhattan Project were quite successful. The feed 
materials program had procured over 10,000 tons of U3O8 and produced 6,600 tons of pure 
uranium by the beginning of 1947. This amount of uranium, the official Manhattan District 
History proudly claims, is an amount that was greater than the total quantity of uranium 
produced in the world prior to the beginning of the Manhattan Project.29 Through the 
construction and operation of the uranium plants, the Manhattan Project effectively created a 
new industry. This industry mined a relatively obscure substance in remote locations and 
transported it to be refined in the center of the American industrial landscape. Those refined 
products then continued on to become the fuel that powered the world’s first atomic weapons. 
Especially when one considers the original goal of 1,700 tons of uranium oxide, the feed 
materials program completed incredibly successful work in a short period of time. But this 
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success had a price, both in the financial and environmental sense. By 1 January 1947,30 the feed 
materials program of the Manhattan Project had spent over $90,000,000 to procure and refine 
uranium products. Of this figure, nearly $59,000,000 was spent operating the various refineries 
simultaneously.31 While this strategy did have the advantage of rapidly increasing production 
capacity, it also spread radioactive wastes to more landscapes and workers than a single uranium 
refinery would have. 
In a 1948 memo to his superior, A.E. Gorman, a sanitary engineer with the Atomic 
Energy Commission stated that “The A.E.C., like most rapidly expanding industrial 
organizations, such as, steel, coal, by-product coke, rubber, oil refining, tanneries, sulphite pulp, 
canning, creameries, etc., has found that its operations create serious problems for and affect the 
rights of others in the area of these operations.”32 The uranium refineries, like other industries 
across the United States, heavily polluted the surrounding environments. Through the operation 
of a uranium refinery, the toxic and radioactive compounds were dumped or otherwise leeched 
into the ground, water, and air surrounding these factories. In line with common industrial 
practice at the time, waste products from uranium refining were deposited into nearby lakes, 
streams, waste grounds, and the surrounding air.  
Where the refineries differed from other industries, however, was the addition of 
radioactivity into the environment. Unlike other noxious pollutants, radioactivity is undetectable 
by human perception. Its ability to silently destroy human tissue has inspired fear and fascination 
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for decades. The nuclear weapons production system was the world’s first industry to issue large 
amounts of radioactive particles into the surrounding environment. At the time, scientists had 
very little understanding about the long-term consequences of radioactive contamination.  By 
1950, several soil and water surveys conducted at various Manhattan Project sites revealed levels 
of uranium clearly elevated from the background level.33 Within the perimeter of the Harshaw 
facility, tests showed that the uranium level in the soil was anywhere from 190 to 340 parts per 
million (ppm).34 In addition, the report clearly stated that uranium refining at AEC facilities was 
adding radioactivity to the streams that drained into larger bodies of water. In a particularly 
alarming example, the same report states that surface water downstream from a scrap storage 
facility in St. Louis, Missouri, was found to contain eighteen times the limit for uranium 
concentration in water as defined by the National Bureau of Standards.35 Despite these clear 
findings of radioactive pollution, scientists were unsure about what the long-term consequences 
might be, and whether or not these levels actually posed a public health threat. This attitude 
continued into the 1980s, where DOE and EPA officials repeatedly claimed that radioactive 
contamination at various DOE sites posed no danger to the public as national newspapers ran 
headlines highlighting decades of contamination.  
In addition to local pollution at the refineries, pollutants tended not to stay within the 
facility boundaries. While natural forces like wind and rain moved some contaminants beyond 
factory fences, human hands moved far more contaminants between facilities. Not only were 
uranium compounds moving from one facility to the next in the production chain, scrap products 
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were as well. The nature of uranium refining in the 1940s was such that there was a large amount 
of uranium left over in the residues from the refining process. Often, there was a higher 
percentage of uranium in the scrap materials than in the fresh uranium ore being mined 
elsewhere. However, it was uneconomical to process the scrap material repeatedly only to get 
diminishing returns. In the race to build the first atomic bomb, the most expedient methods were 
preferred, and the scrap material inventory grew. Sometime after 1945, engineers began shipping 
uranium scrap to a centralized location at a former explosives factory about fifteen kilometers 
north of Niagara Falls on the shores of Lake Ontario. The Lake Ontario Ordinance Works 
(LOOW) became one of the major repositories for uranium scrap in the 1940s. 
It did not take long before large amounts of uranium scrap began to pile up at LOOW. By 
October 1948, LOOW held over 19 million pounds of various types of uranium-bearing sludge, 
residues, and precipitates. Containing only the equivalent of 60,000 pounds of uranium metal, 
this material was stored in concrete buildings, in steel drums, or simply dumped onto the bare 
ground.36 Even with this ad-hoc approach, there was insufficient space to store the increasing 
levels of scrap from the rest of the production system. Eventually, administrators decided to 
construct a storage silo for a particularly useful scrap residue known as K-65. Shipping and 
storing large amounts of scrap or waste to LOOW, however, presented challenges. AEC 
administrators had primarily selected LOOW to store uranium scrap based on convenience, 
rather than any particular quality that might have made storage secure or easy.37 The facility 
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lacked loading and unloading facilities, which, in turn, forced workers to come into prolonged 
contact with radioactive uranium scrap in the course of normal operations.  
On December 2, 1949, African Metals Corporation (AMC) agreed to pay for the extra 
labour required to ship uranium scrap (to which they retained ownership, despite its use in 
nuclear weapons production).38 As part of the deal, AMC also agreed to pay for the medical 
examinations of the shipping contractor’s proposed employees. Engineers at the AEC were 
becoming worried about radiation exposure in workers at LOOW. In November 1950, industrial 
hygienist Richard Heatherton issued a report that confirmed these fears. Heatherton found that 
the average worker dumping scrap uranium at LOOW could expect to receive 435 millireps 
every week.39 This level of exposure was nearly one and a half times the limit for workers in the 
Atomic Energy Commission in 1950, and four and a half times the current limit for nuclear 
workers in the United States. Heatherton suggested several ways to reduce the exposure of 
radiation, including the installation of better safety equipment, and the hiring of additional 
workers. He noted, for example, that operators had installed a concrete shield to protect workers 
when they were removing the lids from the drums containing uranium scrap. However, use of the 
shield required a machine to remotely open the lids which had not been installed.40 Fifty years 
later in an interview with USA Today, Heatherton admitted that for the AEC and their 
contractors, production was the priority. While the AEC recognized the risks, and eventually 
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installed safety equipment, Heatherton explained that the production of nuclear weapons 
components always came before environmental and health concerns.41 
Increasing demand for uranium and its related fissile products after the Second World 
War did not equate to an increased demand for more uranium refineries. Most of the refineries 
that made up the nuclear weapons production complex during the Manhattan Project would not 
survive to see the end of the 1940s. Budgets that were justified in the minds of the American 
electorate as necessary to beat Nazi Germany in the race to an atomic bomb were no longer 
sustainable after the end of the Second World War. President Harry Truman was, after the 
surrender of Japan in August 1945, under great pressure to reduce military spending. The 
uranium refineries, especially those that were older and less efficient, were particularly 
vulnerable to spending cuts. By the end of July 1946, the refineries at the DuPont Deepwater 
Works, Linde, Iowa State, and Electro Metallurgical Company had been shut down. In their 
place, the American government decided to centralize uranium production and increase the 
capacity of the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works refinery. The best data at the time told Manhattan 
Project engineers that MCW was delivering the highest purity product at the cheapest price. In 
order to stretch limited uranium supplies as far as they could go, they made the decision to 
expand MCW and sacrifice the security and redundancy of multiple uranium refineries.42 
Despite Truman’s budget cuts, the demand for nuclear weapons grew after the Second 
World War. Upon hearing news of Japan’s surrender in August of 1945, many Manhattan Project 
scientists assumed that atomic bomb production would cease. The United States had spent an 
incredible amount of money to produce just three weapons by the end of the war. The American 
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military leadership, however, thought differently. The ink on the Japanese Articles of Surrender 
had scarcely dried by the time General Lauris Norstad wrote to General Groves on 15 September 
1945. Agonizing over the large number of conventional Soviet forces, Nortstad argued that the 
United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) required a minimum of 123 atomic bombs, and ideally 
a stockpile of 466 weapons, to completely defeat the Soviet Union.43 While Groves thought this 
estimate was quite high, he did agree that the United States should increase its stockpile of 
atomic bombs.44 In direct opposition to some atomic scientists, military and political leaders 
favoured increased bomb production and came to rely on them to shift the balance of power in a 
time of rapid American demobilization. As General Nortstad’s estimates show, however, 
stockpile requirements from the military were not even remotely based on the AEC’s ability to 
manufacture weapons. Instead, the ever-increasing stockpile requirements seemed to be justified 
based on how many targets the military could find, rather than how many bombs the United 
States could build. The gap between perceptions of the bomb’s power and the actual size of the 
stockpile was so great among the American military and civilian leadership that when AEC 
chairman David Lilienthal briefed President Truman in 1947, the President was shocked to 
discover that the United States only possessed roughly seventeen working bombs.45 
Despite the difference between the imagined might of the American nuclear monopoly 
and the actual strategic situation, bomb development and production continued. On the 
international stage, several events occurred between 1945 and 1950 that encouraged the United 
States to procure a larger arsenal of nuclear weapons. The Truman administration saw crises in 
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Greece and the Turkish Straits in 1946 and 1947 as direct threats to the postwar strategic 
balance. The beginning of the Berlin Blockade in 1948 was further evidence to the American 
leaders that the Soviet Union was inherently aggressive, and that concrete steps needed to be 
taken by the United States to contain them. Truman retaliated to these perceived threats by 
announcing American support for the governments of Turkey and Greece, the Berlin Airlift, and 
later by organizing the formation of NATO in April 1949. Four months later in August 1949, the 
Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb. This came as a complete shock to the American 
leadership, who had assumed that the Soviets were still many years away from producing a 
bomb. In April 1950, National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68) was adopted as formal 
policy, a policy that committed the United States to contain the Soviet Union and prevent the 
spread of communism throughout the world. By June, American troops were directly engaged 
with North Korean soldiers in a war that would last three years and result in very little territory 
lost or gained. In these five short years, the Grand Alliance formed between the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom during the Second World War had dramatically 
devolved into an openly hostile relationship between two nuclear-armed superpowers.46 
The newly created AEC worked to grow the nuclear stockpile in response to rising 
tensions and military demands for weapons. Since the AEC was a civilian agency, it was 
supposed to create distance between the military leadership and the production of powerful 
atomic weapons. Still, the military had overseen the Manhattan Project and they retained 
intimate connections to the leadership of the AEC and the President. In order to answer calls for 
more weapons to shore up the American strategic position, AEC commissioners proposed a 
program of geologic surveys to find additional deposits of uranium. The uranium being mined 
                                                          





from Port Radium and Shinkolobwe, while abundant, was not enough to satiate American 
generals. In 1948, the AEC began a program to encourage private development of American 
uranium deposits. The program contained incentives for private enterprise that included 
minimum prices for uranium ores and bonuses for the discovery of new deposits.47 On the 
Canadian side of the border that same year, the Liberal government announced a similar program 
which allowed private prospectors to look for uranium across Canada.48 Despite these programs, 
it would take time to discover major deposits and even longer to bring new uranium mines into 
production. By the time the Korean War erupted in 1950, geologists had located major deposits 
in the western United States, northern Saskatchewan, and in Ontario. The domestic American 
deposits, however, were very low-grade. As a result, the AEC focused on improving the 
production system in anticipation of increased uranium supplies.  
On November 1, 1952, the United States detonated the world’s first thermonuclear device 
on the island of Enewetak in the Marshall Islands. Code-named Ivy Mike, the test produced an 
explosion over 500 times as powerful as the Fat Man explosion over Nagasaki only seven years 
earlier. As the first successful test of a thermonuclear design, Ivy Mike signaled the beginning of 
a new nuclear arms race. Uranium powered this race and determined everything from the number 
of bombs that could be built to their explosive potential. As a result, the facilities that processed 
and purified the atomic fuel were incredibly important to the larger atomic program. In 
anticipation of both increased uranium receipts and ever-larger stockpile requirements from the 
nation’s military leadership, the AEC developed a modernization and expansion program that 
drastically increased the nation’s ability to refine and produce uranium products. 
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The efforts to refine uranium in support of the Manhattan Project transformed the 
preceding radium industry and created a supply chain that stretched from the Congolese jungle 
and the Canadian subarctic to the New Mexican desert. This chapter has argued that the 
temporary, decentralized uranium production system created during the war was subject to 
military pressures and a race to produce as much uranium as possible in the shortest amount of 
time. Although American officials quickly understood that their uranium refineries were 
polluting the surrounding environment and worker’s bodies, the ultimate goal of production 
remained as the strategic wartime priority. The next phase of uranium refining in the United 
States was, in some ways, different. The next generation of uranium refineries were larger and 
were constructed to last longer than the ad-hoc facilities of the Second World War. These new 
facilities were designed to be more efficient and to handle larger amounts of uranium than their 
predecessors did. However, the new facilities also inherited the precedent established by the 
Manhattan Project. Faced with the pressures of the Cold War, the new generation of uranium 
refineries adopted a similar prioritization of production at the expense of high environmental 
pollution. The next chapter will explore the implications of developing a centralized production 
system by examining the Fernald Feed Materials Production Center, a uranium refinery 










Chapter 2: The Expansion of the Uranium Production Complex, 1950-1957 
 
“The A.E.C. … has found that its operations create serious problems for and affect the rights of 
others in the area of these operations.”1 A.E. Gorman, AEC sanitary engineer, February 1948 
 
 At dawn on Sunday, 25 June 1950, North Korean soldiers crossed the 38th parallel into 
the Republic of Korea, sparking the first major military confrontation of the Cold War. Over the 
next three years, American forces suffered multiple setbacks against North Korean and Chinese 
troops. Frustrated at the lack of progress, generals began to advocate for the deployment of 
nuclear weapons to reverse American failures. Truman’s response to such suggestions was 
complicated. Firmly believing in presidential authority over the use of nuclear weapons, he fired 
General MacArthur in 1951 when the latter threatened to undermine presidential authority. At 
roughly the same time, he ordered the Atomic Energy Commission to release nuclear 
components into the hands of the military.2 The Korean War ended before the United States 
deployed nuclear weapons, but it served as a dramatic opening to a decade filled with significant 
developments in American nuclear history.  
Fueled by Cold War tensions and an eager military leadership, the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) was under constant pressure to produce ever-larger amounts of nuclear 
weapons. In Truman’s final years as president, he authorized large budget increases to the 
agency. The AEC used these funds to shut down old uranium plants and to build new ones. New 
uranium refineries at Fernald (1954) and Weldon Spring (1958) enabled the AEC to refine 
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growing amounts of uranium in a more centralized fashion. Combined with a drastic increase in 
the raw uranium supply after 1955, the Commission vastly improved its ability to manufacture 
nuclear weapons. In doing so, however, the AEC knowingly contaminated the Ohio countryside 
and local workers inside the Fernald Feed Materials Production Center. 
 Even before the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, the AEC was planning 
for an expansion based on the larger effort to develop the hydrogen, or thermonuclear, bomb. On 
31 January 1950, following a strenuous debate among both atomic scientists and national policy 
makers that began during the Manhattan Project, President Truman announced that the United 
States would accelerate the effort to produce such a bomb. Once Truman made the declaration, it 
fell to the AEC to manufacture the required materials. However, there was a significant 
disagreement as to the most efficient way to manufacture these nuclear weapons. In the run-up to 
Truman’s declaration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that building fewer H-bombs would be 
more efficient than using the same fissile material to manufacture many more A-bombs.3 Paul 
Fine, a member of the AEC’s military application division, countered with his own findings. 
Fine argued that to produce enough tritium for a single prototype thermonuclear bomb required a 
facilities expansion worth $150 million and significant quantities of uranium that could 
otherwise be used to build fission bombs.4 William Golden, an aid to AEC Chairman Lewis 
Strauss, came to a different conclusion. In a letter written in the immediate aftermath of the first 
Soviet nuclear detonation in 1949, Golden argued that the United States should intensify its 
efforts towards the development of “superweapons”. He went on to argue that the development 
of hydrogen bombs was much more important than an increase in the rate of production of 
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existing weapons.5 As a result, the AEC faced a problem: it simply did not have the uranium 
supply and production facilities to fulfil the twin directives of increasing fission bomb 
production and accelerated work on the hydrogen bomb at the same time. 
 The answer to this problem was an expansion program. However, AEC administrators 
were unsure of how large an expansion was necessary. In the first half of 1950, a thermonuclear 
weapon was still in the stage of experimental speculation. Scientists had not produced a working 
prototype, and there was significant disagreement over whether such a bomb was physically 
possible. While the AEC was confident that the Hanford Site could manufacture enough tritium 
for a single test within a year, this would not suffice for full-scale production. On 8 June 1950, 
Truman authorized the construction of two new heavy-water reactors for tritium production.6 
The construction of the new reactors were in addition to expansions that were already under way 
at Hanford and Oak Ridge by the summer of 1950.7 These expansions would increase the United 
States’ ability to convert refined uranium into plutonium and enriched uranium. However, 
expanded facilities at Hanford and Oak Ridge did nothing to improve the supply of refined 
uranium. In 1949, the AEC’s uranium supply was tenuous, with 84 percent of its uranium 
coming from foreign sources. Until 1955, much of the uranium for the American bomb program 
came from the Shinkolobwe mine in the Belgian Congo. The effort to produce an H-bomb would 
make that supply even more vulnerable by reducing the amount of uranium available for 
plutonium production.8  By the summer of 1951, however, the AEC was confident that the newly 
discovered uranium deposits in Canada would drastically change their supply situation within a 
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few years.9 The expected increase in uranium supply, coupled with the increased production 
demands, meant that the AEC would have to plan for yet another expansion to refine uranium 
and feed the other production plants. 
 At the same time that the AEC was planning to construct additional reactors, the nation’s 
capacity to produce refined uranium products faced challenges. In the wake of the Second World 
War, uranium ore supplies to the United States remained relatively low. In order to ensure the 
efficient use of a scarce resource, the AEC consolidated refining operations at the Mallinckrodt 
Chemical Works (MCW) in downtown St. Louis. While MCW was the largest uranium refinery 
at the AEC’s disposal, it had several deficiencies. As opposed to the remote –and thus secure– 
facilities constructed from scratch during the war, MCW was located in the middle of a major 
industrial city. Further, MCW was not a single building, but rather a series of factories spread out 
across several city blocks. As a result, MCW was a relatively unsecure facility as compared to 
Hanford or Oak Ridge. In addition, its location amplified the potential harm to residents and the 
environment. Without a buffer zone of empty space,10 contamination from potential accidents, as 
well as routine operations, negatively affected a larger population. Boxed in by the Mississippi 
River on one side, and existing infrastructure on the other three, MCW was also unable to 
expand operations without significant financial investment. As the Joint Chiefs and members of 
Congress demanded larger and larger fissile materials production, MCW seemed incapable of 
meeting the growing national defense mission.11 
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 The AEC perceived other facilities in a similar light. In January 1949, Edward Sargent, 
manager of the Ohio area office of the AEC, authored a classified report that argued conditions 
at the Middlesex Sampling Plant in Middlesex, New Jersey were “…unsatisfactory from both an 
operational and a health standpoint.” Sargent suggested that an investment of about $270,000 
was enough to improve the plant, whereas it required roughly $750,000 to build an entirely new 
plant at a more central location.12 Despite Sargent’s recommendation, the AEC decided to 
incorporate the functions of the Middlesex plant into the Fernald Feed Materials Production 
Center, which began full operations in 1954. Closing soon after, the fate of the Middlesex plant 
was typical of many facilities from the Manhattan Project. Jury-rigged to help refine uranium, 
the AEC chose to build new plants in centralized locations rather than spend smaller sums to 
renovate the network of older factories. 
 A combination of crowded uranium refineries and increasing weapons requirements 
encouraged unprecedented budgets for the AEC. In the wake of the invasion of South Korea, 
President Truman twice asked Congress for additional funding for atomic weapons production. 
On 7 July 1950, he asked for $260 million. On 1 December, he asked for over $1 billion in 
additional funding to produce fissile materials, much of it earmarked for construction.13 By the 
summer of 1951, construction crews were active at three new sites across the country, including 
Fernald. In order to directly increase plutonium production capacity, a new facility analogous to 
Hanford was under construction in South Carolina, about 40 kilometers southeast of Augusta, 
Georgia. In addition, a new gaseous diffusion plant was being built at Paducah, Kentucky. These 
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new plants were built in addition to expansions taking place at previously established sites such 
as Hanford and Oak Ridge. At Hanford, new reactors and processing plants were added to the 
WWII-vintage facilities. At Oak Ridge, additional capacity to enrich uranium was built. By the 
time the belligerents on the Korean peninsula called a truce in 1953, the AEC employed nearly 
149,000 people across construction sites, production plants, laboratories, and offices in the 
United States.14 
At the beginning of 1953, President Eisenhower took office, bringing with him a different 
conception of what role nuclear weapons should play in the larger context of national defense. 
His predecessor, President Truman, was quite clear that atomic weapons were special weapons 
that posed a significant risk to international stability, whether they were used or not. Truman’s 
efforts to place nuclear weapons under the control of a civilian agency, the AEC, and his desire 
to keep the power to use nuclear weapons within the discretion of the office of the president 
reflected a well-placed uneasiness regarding the power of nuclear weapons.15 Eisenhower, by 
comparison, was eager to change the way nuclear weapons were understood. While Eisenhower 
spent much of his presidency attempting to push forward arms control agreements, he also spoke 
about the atomic bomb as just another weapon in the American arsenal.16  
By the end of 1953, a program of massive retaliation and engagement with the nuclear 
arms race were major components of Eisenhower’s foreign policy. NSC 162/2, approved by 
Eisenhower in October, outlined the security requirements of the United States in the face of the 
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Soviet threat. In particular, NSC 162/2 called for “a strong military posture, with emphasis on the 
capacity of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power.” As the document 
went on to argue, “…sufficient atomic weapons and effective means of delivery are 
indispensable for U.S. security.”17 Demonstrating a paradigm shift in atomic strategy, NSC 162/2 
argued that the same special weapons that Truman had placed under civilian command should 
become the very cornerstone of American national security. Known to historians as 
Eisenhower’s “New Look” strategy, the reliance on nuclear weapons for national defense 
quickly ran into trouble. As H.W. Brands notes, the New Look suffered from repeated policy 
revisions as well as confusion regarding the applicability of using nuclear weapons during the 
crises in the Taiwan Strait and the conflict in French Indochina.18 
The New Look relied on a radical advancement in nuclear weapons technology. Despite 
the significant power of the Ivy Mike test in November 1952, the device weighed 82 tons, and 
was thus not deployable by any practical means in the American arsenal. Less than two years 
later in March 1954, the scientists returned with a new design. Detonating a device weighing 
only 11 tons over the Bikini Atoll, the Castle Bravo test resulted in a 15-megaton explosion.19 
Armed with the knowledge of the successful test, the AEC began to build a new nuclear arsenal. 
The successful Castle Bravo design was both deployable and had the ability to be mass-
produced. In addition, the design was infinitely scalable, meaning weapons designers could make 
the design larger or smaller with little effort. This development in nuclear weapons design made 
the American military’s wish for an increased variety of nuclear weapons easier to fulfil. As the 
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Cold War intensified, the Department of Defense desired a large spectrum of atomic weapons, 
from small tactical weapons to large thermonuclear bombs. Eisenhower’s New Look supported 
the military’s nuclear ambitions, but it was the AEC’s task to deliver the weapons. 
Under Eisenhower’s administration, nuclear weapons were re-categorized from special 
weapons to the underlying foundation of foreign policy and military might. As a result, AEC 
production sites became even more pivotal to the nation’s defense. Throughout the 1950s, the 
Strategic Air Command increased its potential bombing targets from 1700 targets in 1954 to 
2400 targets in 1959.20 The increased demand for nuclear weapons also came at the same time 
that additional inventories of uranium concentrates from Canada and the United States were 
becoming available. Since 1943, the Belgian Congo had been the single largest supplier of 
uranium ore to the United States. From 1948 to 1953, the AEC purchased between 2,000 and 
3,500 tons of uranium concentrate a year from all of its sources. In these years, production from 
mines in Canada and the United States was often less than 1,000 tons combined. In 1954, 
uranium output from American, Canadian, and overseas sources all increased. In 1955, they 
increased again, and the AEC purchased nearly 6,000 tons of uranium. By 1956, uranium 
production from the United States and Canada nearly doubled from the year before and overseas 
sources were not far behind. That same year, the AEC purchased 10,400 tons of uranium in total, 
with almost 1,600 tons coming from Canada.21  
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Figure 2.1 Atomic Energy Commission Purchases of Uranium Concentrate in tons, 1943-1965.22 
 
 
By 1955, the nuclear weapons production complex looked much different than it had in 
1945. The changes were most profound in terms of scale, but also in terms of the centralization 
of uranium refining and the type of environment surrounding the uranium plants. Situated 
roughly eighteen miles northwest of downtown Cincinnati, the Fernald plant was located on 
1,050 acres of farmland. In the surrounding area, thousands of people lived on farms, suburbs, 
and cottages. Only two miles from the production plant, local children spent their summers at 
Fort Scott, the oldest Roman Catholic summer camp in the United States.23   
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Instead of several small facilities located in industrial centers across the eastern United 
States, the AEC’s uranium feed materials came from a new, modern, centralized uranium 
refinery at Fernald. In Cincinnati, some citizens cheered the arrival of nuclear industry to their 
city. On 31 March 1951, the headline of the Cincinnati Enquirer exclaimed that a “huge” AEC 
atomic plant would be constructed in Hamilton County. The Enquirer happily quoted AEC 
officials who claimed that the new plant would be very safe: “Mr. Chandler [civil engineer and 
AEC Fernald Area Manager] emphasized that no atomic weapons will be made on the site and 
that operations will not create environmental toxic or radiological hazards. Nor will there be 
explosive hazards, he said.”24 But, not everyone was excited. The Fernald plant needed space 
that was already occupied by farmers, some of whom claimed their family’s land as a reward for 
service in the American Revolutionary war. Others worried that Fernald would act as a target for 
Soviet bombers in the case of a nuclear war.25 However, while the creation of an AEC facility 
would have undoubtedly attracted the attention of Soviet war-planners, the same facilities also 
promised to bring more economic benefit and higher workplace safety standards than 
contemporary industrial plants. Since the beginning of the Manhattan Project, jobs at atomic 
facilities were coveted by tradespeople as well-paying and supposedly safe.26 
Still, residents and former employees of Fernald recall very little infrastructure in the area 
when construction began in 1951. Raymond Wolf, a process engineer at Fernald from 1951 to 
1966, remembered that his first office was in an old farmhouse in the middle of a cornfield.27 
Helen Underwood, a secretary for the construction company, recalled that her office was in a 
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renovated chicken house.28 Nevertheless, by 1954 construction at Fernald was finished and 
employees could drive to work at the plant on paved roads, and enjoy proper office space. With 
the establishment of the Fernald refinery, the local population also increased. As Underwood 
later described: “What used to be a rural community is no longer rural.”29 
Former workers at Fernald remember that the pay was good, and that the opportunity for 
unlimited overtime allowed them to afford a middle-class lifestyle. Hillery Webb began working 
at Fernald in the 1950s. As he later described the situation:  
…if you wanted to work overtime all you had to do is go over there and say I’d like to 
work 16 hours tonight. And we did a lot of those. And I was making good money and I 
was just as happy as I could be. I was getting my bills paid, I was feeding the kids good 
and buying nice clothes for them, paying on an automobile or two, a boat, home. I was 
doing real good.30 
Other workers remember being motivated by the Cold War. Loyd Smith, who also worked at 
Fernald in the 1950s, saw how his job was connected to the larger international tensions at the 
time. Smith recalled working 14-hour days, 7 days a week for an entire year. He understood that 
the pace at Fernald was due to the Cold War and that production of uranium outweighed all other 
factors. He also recalled that production levels at Fernald were directly related to the American 
“Massive Retaliation” deterrent strategy. As he explained:  
…retaliation will be possible because of what we're doing here [at Fernald] because the 
idea was if Khrushchev would say we have 20 nuclear bombs and they're ready to go, we 
could say we got 40 and it's a deterrent. And that's the way most everybody looked at it. 
And felt like it was a matter of survival.31 
 Smith’s emphasis on the US nuclear deterrence strategy was certainly shared by the 
leadership of the AEC and the American military. During the Second World War, the Manhattan 
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Project was focused on the proof of a concept: that an atomic weapon was feasible. To that end, 
the Manhattan Engineering District assembled a conglomerate of industrial interests to produce 
uranium products. With the acceleration of the Cold War, the AEC was now tasked with 
producing as many megatons of explosive power as possible. To meet this end, the AEC spent 
$35 billion (in 1996 dollars) between 1951 and 1955 to expand and modernize its production 
system with facilities to quickly and efficiently produce nuclear weapons.32 In terms of 
production, the AEC was incredibly successful in achieving those goals. In three short years 
from 1959 to 1961, the United States produced 19,500 warheads, equivalent to 25 weapons per 
workday. By 1960, the megatonnage of the entire American arsenal had reached 20.5 billion tons 
of TNT, or 1.4 million Hiroshima-sized bombs.33 Whereas the Manhattan project was successful 
in producing an experimental weapon, the Atomic Energy Commission helped create a massive 
arsenal of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. 
While creating this vast nuclear arsenal, the Atomic Energy Commission and its 
contractor at Fernald, the National Lead Company of Ohio (NLO), sought to enhance its safety 
reputation during the design and construction of Fernald. The recent experience of the operation 
of the older Manhattan Project refineries was reflected in Fernald’s design. Studies conducted by 
the AEC at the older sites revealed that uranium and other contaminants easily seeped into soil 
and groundwater when exposed to the elements.34 As a result, contractors built Fernald with a 
comprehensive sewer system that was designed to trap radioactive contaminants within the entire 
fenced area of the plant. Engineers also designed a collection system to catch uranium dust, 
thereby reducing radiation exposure to the lungs of workers and nearby residents. Even Fernald’s 
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chosen location made sense from an industrial hygiene point of view. In Plutopia, Kate Brown 
argues that engineers purposefully built the Hanford Site in a remote location near a fast-moving 
river to protect the local population from radioactive pollutants.35 In a similar way, Fernald was 
constructed on farmland away from the industrial center of Cincinnati. The additional safety 
features and physical placement of Fernald gave both workers and citizens concrete reasons to 
trust in the safety of the plant. 
However, while it was relatively easy to trust the technological systems that promised 
environmental protection and worker safety, it was more difficult to ensure that those systems 
actually worked. After ten years of operations at Fernald, an internal committee set up to 
investigate groundwater contamination was unambiguous about the failures of Fernald’s safety 
systems. In a 1962 report, the committee found that the sewer system, which contained over nine 
miles of sewer lines, failed to operate as intended. Rather than isolating uranium from rainwater, 
the sewer system instead funneled uranium away from Fernald and into the local water system. 
Engineers had recognized the problem as early as 1954 but failed to enforce a solution. The 
amount of uranium lost to the storm sewers steadily grew until it reached 11,800 pounds in 
1961.36 The dust collection system almost immediately ran into problems as well. While the 
collectors seem to have effectively removed uranium dust from the interior of the plant, the 
collected uranium was difficult to contain. Similar to a burst vacuum cleaner, the dust collector 
often failed and released uranium. Once free of the dust collectors, the uranium acted like other 
contaminants, and moved into the groundwater via the sewer system. 37 
                                                          
35 Brown, Plutopia, 59. 
36 In 1956, losses via the storm sewer totaled 1,800 pounds. 
37 Based on experience from the Manhattan Project, engineers understood that uranium oxides left exposed to the 
elements were quickly washed away by precipitation. As designed, the sewer system was supposed to drain 





Beyond the failures of technical systems, environmental damage was also enabled by 
poor choices made by the AEC. In general, the AEC kept particular criteria in mind when 
selecting a location for their facilities. New projects planned after the Second World War needed 
to be located close to existing resources, such as water, electricity, housing, a large workforce, 
and fuel. They also needed to be built in a defensible area of the United States. As Soviet bomber 
range increased, this meant locating atomic plants farther away from the coasts or the northern 
border. In the particular case of Fernald, the AEC decided on preliminary requirements of a fast-
flowing stream of at least 500 cubic feet per second, at least 30,000 kilowatts of power, and a 
square mile of relatively flat land, all located near a major industrial city.38 The site for Fernald 
was selected by the AEC out of a total of 63 locations in seven states.39 Fernald’s location 
matched all the requirements of the AEC. In addition to the flushing of effluents provided by the 
Miami River, the Fernald site was located directly on top of a large, supposedly unused, aquifer. 
The presence of this aquifer simultaneously excited and worried AEC administrators. While it 
could potentially provide water for the refining processes at Fernald, it also presented a liability 
if the aquifer was contaminated by Fernald operations. Thus, the AEC commissioned the first of 
many groundwater surveys that attempted to figure out which direction the water was moving, 
how quickly, and whether Fernald was adding contaminants to the aquifer.40  
The groundwater studies conducted by the AEC and United States Geological Survey 
(USGS) often gave mixed information. The first groundwater survey in 1951 by the USGS 
cautioned that any contamination of the groundwater would eventually reach surface streams. 
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This report warned that contamination was likely to migrate from the groundwater into surface 
water via underground streams.41 By 1962, a different survey report argued that while “it is 
probable that several tens of thousands of gallons per day of effluent could seep from the [waste] 
pit without being detected,” it would require an estimated “25 to 30 years [for the groundwater] 
to move 14,000 feet to the Miami River.”42 Over the space of ten years, there were conflicting 
conclusions drawn about the groundwater under Fernald. Whereas early reports highlighted the 
vulnerability of the groundwater to contamination, later reports argued that contaminated 
groundwater did not necessarily pose a threat and would take many years to reach water supplies.  
As problematic as the geological surveys were, it is not surprising that the operators of 
the plant turned to these surveys for information. Studies written by trained geologists presented 
an objective measurement of environmental harm. NLO had a difficult task of producing as 
much uranium as possible as cheaply as possible while keeping environmental harm to a 
minimum. NLO’s production goals were objective and easy to measure. Either Fernald was 
producing enough uranium within its budget, or it was not. As opposed to a production goal, 
environmental harm was harder to measure. The operators could conduct studies that measured 
uranium in the water, soil, and air, but the results of those studies were not straightforward. 
There were no strong regulations in place with which NLO could compare their measurements, 
and the Ohio State Board of Health did not set public limits for contaminants in the environment. 
Instead, Fernald operated under guidelines established through informal agreements between 
NLO, the AEC, and the State of Ohio. A 1962 NLO report into ground contamination 
summarized this relationship by stating, “The State does not publish a list of MAC’s [Maximum 
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Allowable Concentration] for contaminants in public waters. The limits under which the FMPC 
[Feed Materials Production Center] operates were established by; (1) letters of agreement, (2) 
verbal agreement, (3) formal negotiation, (4) unilateral proposals and (5) suggestions.” Often, 
these limits were agreed upon only after the AEC produced some form of classified evidence to 
convince the State of Ohio officials to agree to a particular limit.43 Since the AEC had a 
monopoly of information regarding classified nuclear secrets, it gave them a large advantage in 
any negotiation. In a sense, there were no outside experts or powers of public investigation that 
the State of Ohio could call upon to evaluate the environmental effects of Fernald. The AEC 
could hide any harmful consequences behind the wall of nuclear secrecy. 
The problem, then, was that environmental safety was not objectively defined. Safe limits 
were determined arbitrarily and without public consultation. In 1951, in anticipation for the 
beginning of operations at Fernald, the Ohio State Department of Health suggested a maximum 
limit of 0.035 parts per million (ppm) of uranium downriver from the Fernald effluent 
discharge.44 In response, the AEC suggested a limit of 0.35 ppm, ten times higher than the 
Department of Health’s original suggestion. The Department of Health agreed to the higher limit 
and this agreement governed the limit for uranium leaving the Fernald plant until at least 1962.45 
Even this elevated limit, however, was rarely maintained. In 1959, the average concentration of 
uranium in water taken downstream from the Fernald outfall was 1.83 ppm. The single highest 
reading was 15.68 ppm taken in August. Even with these incredibly high readings, operators 
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argued that they were only high because rain during dry seasons was causing a large amount of 
uranium to wash out at once.46 Without strong regulations enforced by an outside agency, NLO 
and the AEC could spin their pollution readings whichever way they preferred while continuing 
to argue that they operated a safe plant that protected the surrounding environment and people. 
While NLO and the AEC claimed that they were interested in running a plant that was 
clean and safe, their main priority was producing uranium for nuclear weapons. The construction 
and initial operation of Fernald took place during a larger, more systematic, expansion by the 
AEC. The Department of Defense and the AEC annually determined the amount of fissile 
material that needed to be produced to defend the country. As the atomic stockpile grew, the 
American military found more targets. By 1956, General Norstad’s original fifteen primary 
targets had grown to thousands of targets.47 To hit each of those targets, the Air Force assumed 
that they needed several bombs, since some would be lost to the enemy’s air defense. What had 
originally been a war plan designed to destroy the Soviet Union’s ability to wage war had 
become, in the opinion of certain American military leaders, “overkill”. A U.S. Navy study from 
1960 found that in order to cause the same damage from a 13 kiloton Hiroshima-sized bomb, 
nuclear war-planners had assigned 300 to 500 kilotons of weapons to a single target.48 
 By 1955, the AEC operated thirteen separate reactors to produce plutonium for the 
thousands of nuclear weapons needed in the war plans.49 The AEC needed to feed each of those 
reactors with a steady stream of high-purity uranium metal. Without production from Fernald, 
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the production of plutonium would stop, and with it, the manufacture of nuclear weapons. From 
the beginning, Fernald was operating at near capacity.50 
In the Cold War context, environmental pollution and worker safety became secondary 
concerns to uranium production at Fernald. By the mid-1950s, construction at the plant was 
complete and full-scale production of uranium had begun. In order to meet production quotas 
from the AEC, NLO organized Fernald to run on three shifts, seven days a week. Workers 
reported to one of ten separate buildings at Fernald organized based on function. As uranium 
flowed through each plant, workers refined the uranium into successive intermediate compounds 
until it was reduced to pure uranium metal. Uranium was crushed, burned, dissolved in acid, 
boiled, reduced to metal, and rolled into shape. The production of uranium metal at Fernald 
required acids, hydrogen gas, nitrates, fluorides, and large amounts of water at high 
temperatures. Pipes, furnaces, boilers, digestion tanks, and other heavy equipment surrounded 
workers. While most of this was quite normal in any chemical plant in the United States, the 
workers at Fernald dealt with the added dangers of radioactive uranium dust in a self-regulating 
industry under incredible pressure operated by a company eager to introduce new engineering 
systems in the world’s first purpose-built uranium refinery.51 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the first years of operation at Fernald were the worst for worker 
safety. At the beginning of full operations in 1954, Fernald employed approximately 1,700 
workers in well-paying positions. The first worker fatalities occurred that year. In March 1954, 
an explosion in Plant 6 of the Fernald facility killed two workers. Throughout that year, several 
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more explosions rocked the plant, although no more fatalities occurred.52 In addition to the acids 
and furnaces of a regular chemical plant, the Fernald refinery workers faced unique dangers 
when handling pure metallic uranium. Uranium in this form can combust, especially when piles 
of chips and shavings build up. Fires, explosions, and plentiful uranium dust contributed to an 
alarming record of radiation exposure. In 1955, over 90 percent of Fernald workers had 
exposures to their lungs above the AEC limit of 15 rem per year.53 Yet, NLO responded slowly 
to workplace safety concerns. The share of workers being exposed to yearly radiation doses 
above 15 rem did not fall below 40 percent until 1965.54  
In addition to the pressure to produce uranium brought on by the Cold War, the AEC 
expected Fernald to reduce the amount of scrap uranium within the larger production system. 
While various uranium plants ceased production in the 1940s and 1950s, the scrap material that 
had been stored there generally stayed at its plant of origin. Some of the scrap materials were 
sent from the older uranium facilities to the Lake Ontario Ordinance Works, but much of it 
remained on-site at places like Vitro, Middlesex, and the St. Louis Airport Site. This situation 
presented a rather large problem for the AEC, since the materials were stored in appalling 
conditions with little money in the budget to improve them. In a 1953 letter, officials at the 
Middlesex Sampling Plant described thorium residues packaged into cardboard barrels. While 
Quonset huts protected these barrels from the elements, Middlesex officials warned the operators 
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at Fernald that improper storage conditions would cause problems. In particular, J.J. Costa 
warned D. J. Blythe that the cardboard barrels could not be stored more than two tiers high, or 
they would burst open. Costa further stressed that these barrels should be stored in a heated and 
ventilated environment of at least 2550 square feet for the materials stored at Middlesex. The 
tone of Costa’s letter suggests that Fernald did not have the required storage space, and that there 
were no plans to address this problem.55 Over three years later at Vitro, radioactive residues were 
stored in open-air piles without any form of fencing or warning signs to the public.56  
The storage of radioactive residues created two problems for the AEC. First, the residues 
posed a contamination risk to nearby residents. Sanitary engineers were well aware of how 
quickly uranium could wash out beyond the perimeter of these sites.57 The longer the residues 
stayed at the old Manhattan Project sites, the more uranium would seep into the ground and 
water. Second, without the removal of uranium residues, the Manhattan Project sites could not be 
returned to their previous owners. At the Vitro plant, for example, the AEC had contracted Vitro 
to store uranium residues only until the end of 1955. The AEC moved slowly on this issue and 
had still not removed the residues by September of 1956. With the residues still on the property, 
Vitro was unable to carry out expansions or to use the land in any other way.58 Once uranium 
supplies improved through the years from 1955 to 1957, the scrap uranium sitting in residue piles 
became a liability rather than an asset to the AEC. 
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To deal with this problem, the AEC tried various solutions. The AEC first attempted to 
sell residues to industrial corporations, usually for the precious metal content of the ores. When 
this was met with a weak response from the private sector, the AEC turned to disposal at sea or 
in private waste dumps. By September of 1954, the Middlesex plant had shipped over 130 tons 
of contaminated scrap to be dumped into the sea.59 Two years later at Vitro, the AEC decided to 
dispose of leftover residues at a privately operated garbage dump owned by the Pennsylvania 
Railroad. F.R. Dowling, the Director of the Feed Materials Division, listed eight reasons as to 
why this method of disposal was ideal, including: 
…the [radioactive] material would be widely dispersed and intermixed with tremendous 
volumes of [non-radioactive] wastes; any further leaching will be to a minimum degree 
since the material has been stored in an open area, without protection from the weather, 
from 3 to 11 years; the absences of floods…practically precludes any possibility of 
backwash; the nearest residence is approximately one-quarter of a mile distant; the 
Pennsylvania Railroad has no reservations about accepting the material from a health or 
hazardous viewpoint.60 
  
In addition to ad-hoc waste disposal at particular sites, the AEC found more creative ways to 
dispose of scrap uranium. In 1956, the AEC approved the release of 200 pounds of scrap 
uranium to the Fire Hazards of Atomic Industry School located at the United States Navy base in 
Norfolk, Virginia.61 Such instances were rare, however, and the dominant method of disposal 
was either to deal with scrap locally or to ship it to Fernald for processing. 
AEC administrators expected Fernald to serve not only as a central repository for 
uranium scrap, but also to eliminate such inventories by refining. This strategy made particular 
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sense when uranium supplies were scarce. Uranium scraps were not necessarily waste, as the 
AEC still wanted to reprocess the scraps through the uranium system until it was no longer 
economical to recover the uranium content. However, AEC officials struggled to balance several 
factors when operating scrap uranium plants. First, it was cheaper and more efficient to refine 
fresh uranium supplies than to process scrap materials. At the same time, AEC planners desired 
enough scrap to operate the plants at full capacity in order to obtain the highest economic return. 
On the other hand, they also desired enough scrap processing capacity to reduce the surplus scrap 
currently left over from earlier production. While there was a dedicated scrap plant in operation 
at Fernald and the MCW works in St. Louis, they could only reduce the surplus inventory of 
scrap by about 300 tons a year.62 By May 1956, the situation was critical enough that NLO 
submitted a $1.15 million proposal to expand Fernald’s scrap plant. NLO warned the AEC that 
without the proposed expansion, scrap inventories would continue to rise at Fernald.63  
 As 1957 ended, the AEC’s production system looked radically different than it had in 
1952. The last of the Manhattan Project-era refineries had shut down, and in their place stood 
two new refineries at Fernald and Weldon Spring. Massive new uranium enrichment plants and 
new plutonium production reactors had been built by the AEC. New factories at Pantex and 
Rocky Flats ensured more weapons could be made faster. Perhaps more importantly, the uranium 
supply situation had undergone a rapid transformation. From just 3,600 tons of uranium in 1952, 
the AEC purchased over 16,000 tons from all sources in 1957. In 1952, the United States had 
approximately 800 nuclear weapons but by the end of 1957, they counted over 5,500 warheads in 
their arsenal. Despite the rapid transformation, AEC planners expected continued growth through 
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the end of the 1950s. Cold War tensions remained high, Eisenhower had secured a second term 
at the end of 1956, and uranium supplies showed no signs of dwindling. At the AEC facilities, 
there was to be no slowing down. Working three shifts, seven days a week, Fernald was expected 
to not only feed the plutonium plants, but also to reduce the amount of scrap and waste now 
piling up within the entire system. With a sister plant at Weldon Spring now online, the United 
States’ capacity to produce uranium, and the nuclear bombs that went with it, grew tremendously 
by the second half of the 1950s. The same Cold War tensions that had sparked a massive 
infrastructure expansion within the AEC did not ease during Eisenhower’s term as president. 
Now armed with a surplus of uranium, Fernald was about to enter the next phase of production 
with disastrous consequences for the surrounding environment. 
 
Figure 2.2. Expansion and Consolidation of Atomic Energy Commission Facilities, 1944-1957. 






Chapter 3: Uranium Boom and Bust at Fernald, 1959-1989 
 
“You heard more about Fernald after it quit processing uranium than you did before.”1 
Raymond Wuest, Fernald Area Resident, May 1999 
 
  
 During Eisenhower’s second term as president, the world’s uranium supplies changed 
dramatically. For the first time, the Atomic Energy Commission moved from a condition of 
uranium scarcity to a surplus of uranium. This shift, however dramatic, was not unexpected. The 
number of uranium mines in Canada had steadily increased throughout the 1950s so that by 1959 
uranium was the chief mineral export of Canada.2 In the United States, a hugely successful 
purchasing program run by the AEC transformed vast mountains of low-level uranium ores into 
profitable yet environmentally destructive uranium mines. Uranium traveled thousands of 
kilometers from Canada and the western United States to individual facilities that made up the 
nuclear weapons production system. At each facility, lax environmental regulation left to local 
authorities did little to prevent uranium from entering the ground, air, and water. In the late 
1950s, the American nuclear weapons production system operated at full capacity in order to 
keep up with the arms race with the USSR. As the Cold War entered a more dangerous phase, 
workers at Fernald worked at a fever-pitch to produce uranium, while engineers struggled to 
contain uranium contamination. In 1959, a combination of plentiful uranium supplies, Cold War 
tensions, and poor environmental regulations caused pollution levels to spike at Fernald. This 
created a radioactive legacy that went undiscovered by the local population until the mid 1980s. 
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 By the mid-1950s, uranium destined for nuclear weapons traveled thousands of 
kilometres through an industrial system of mines, refineries, reactors, enrichment plants, and 
chemical plants. No longer a patchwork of jury-rigged factories, the new weapons production 
system was purpose-built to manufacture as many nuclear weapons as possible. Corporations 
mined uranium at several major production sites. In Canada, the vast majority of uranium was 
mined at Uranium City in northern Saskatchewan and at Elliot Lake in Ontario. In the United 
States, the Four Corners3 region supplied vast volumes of low-density ore. Once the uranium ore 
had been concentrated at a local mill, the concentrates were sent to a uranium refinery. By 1958, 
there were three such refineries in North America: the Eldorado refinery at Port Hope, Ontario, 
the National Lead of Ohio’s Fernald refinery in Ohio, and the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works’ 
Weldon Spring refinery in Missouri. At these refineries, uranium concentrates were processed 
into more useful products such as metallic uranium, uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), or uranium 
hexafluoride (UF6). The uranium was then split into two streams. Uranium tetrafluoride and 
uranium hexafluoride were sent to enrichment plants to produce enriched uranium, while the 
metallic uranium was sent to plutonium production complexes at Hanford, Washington and 
Savannah River, South Carolina. At these large complexes, uranium metal was processed into 
plutonium. Enriched uranium and metallic plutonium were re-joined at Rocky Flats, a facility in 
Colorado that manufactured plutonium primaries and worked with enriched uranium. Primaries 
manufactured at Rocky Flats and secondaries manufactured at Oak Ridge were sent to the Pantex 
facility in Texas. At Pantex, nuclear primaries and secondaries as well as non-nuclear 
components were joined together to make finished weapons.4 
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 This uranium production complex was both a critical piece of military infrastructure as 
well as an important economic driver. A very visible portion of the military-industrial complex, 
the uranium production system poured investment capital into the economy and consumed 
immense volumes of resources.5 As Cold War tensions escalated, uranium production in North 
America increased dramatically. In 1954, the AEC consumed over 50 percent of American 
fluoride production.6 Peaking in 1956, the uranium production system consumed 12 percent of 
the electricity output of the United States.7 By 1960, the AEC was purchasing over 30,000 tons 
of uranium per year, representing a more than tenfold increase since 1950. Eisenhower’s New 
Look policy and its reliance on the nuclear deterrent had created a nearly insatiable demand for 
nuclear weapons and their raw components. The result was an immense industrial bomb 
production system that stretched across the United States, employed thousands of workers, 
consumed immense resources, and fueled the arms race.   
 Yet for every bomb that was loaded into a bomb bay, and every worker that received 
their monthly wages, there were materials left behind. Each piece of uranium that flowed through 
the system produced a trail of contaminants, residues, and wastes. At the uranium mines, 
mountains of rock were separated from the uranium oxides found within. At refineries such as 
Fernald and Weldon Spring, uranium dust and other toxic chemicals spilled from the plants into 
the surrounding environment. At plutonium production facilities such as Hanford and Savannah 
River, incredibly toxic and highly radioactive liquid wastes were stored in massive underground 
tank farms designed to isolate waste from the environment. Not surprisingly, these tank farms 
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leaked, and the liquid waste joined radioactive fumes and reactor effluent escaping into the 
surrounding air, soil, and water.8  
Except for the added radioactivity, the factories of the uranium production system were 
not unlike other facilities across the industrialized world. Since the beginning of the industrial 
revolution, factories, steam engines, mines, and oilfields had spewed forth an enormous volume 
of pollutants into their surrounding environments. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
citizens organized against the negative effects of industrialization by arguing that pollution 
constituted a nuisance. While there were few laws prohibiting pollution, there were strong 
nuisance laws in the United States that were used to argue that particular instances of pollution 
were causing harm. Before the First World War, a new sub-discipline of sanitary engineering 
began to be practiced in cities across the country. Responding to urban pollution, sanitary 
engineers designed sewage systems, landfills, and water treatment plants. Beginning after the 
First World War, individual states enacted legislation that gave state boards of health regulatory 
powers over state bodies of water. By framing pollution as a health and nuisance issue, various 
parties were able to curtail pollution in a limited, local way.9 
At the federal level, however, there was very little action taken against pollution in the 
first half of the 20th century. Nation-wide regulations regarding industrial pollution were small in 
number and weak in their enforcement. Even as late as 1955, the federal government spent less 
than 3 percent of its annual budget on environmental programs. As a result, harm from pollution 
was dealt with on a local, case-by-case basis. Anyone opposing pollution had to rely on the 
common law and the state boards of health. This strategy, in some instances, could be relatively 
successful. Courts were familiar with awarding damages based on a loss of property value, 
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though not to stopping the pollution in the first place.10 The state boards of health could also be 
effective at preventing pollution through mutual agreement. The Ohio State Board of Health, in 
particular, had a reputation for being an effective regulator. The state boards of health employed 
sanitary engineers and their preferred method of engagement with industry was that of 
cooperation rather than conflict. This approach was evident in the Ohio State Board of Health’s 
interactions with the AEC. In the absence of strong federal regulations, the AEC and their 
contractor, National Lead of Ohio (NLO), were able to negotiate pollution limits with the state 
board of health.11 
 The nuisance laws that were used to prevent smoke and water contamination were 
unequipped to deal with atomic-age pollution. While plenty of other industries were heavy 
polluters in the 1950s, the uranium industry was different in several aspects. First, the pollutants 
were radioactive. While scientists had understood since the beginning of the 20th century that 
radiation was potentially harmful, the installations of the AEC were the first major industrial 
polluters to send radioactive particles into the soil, air, and water across the United States. As 
opposed to more “common” pollutants such as oil or chlorides, the patchwork of health and 
environmental regulators in the United States had little to no prior experience with radioactive 
pollution. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, researchers had pieced together the unique 
biological and ecological pathways of radioactive materials. In particular, scientists quickly 
understood that the human body readily absorbed multiple radioactive isotopes and deposited 
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them within body tissues, instead of allowing them to pass through the body.12 Since this finding 
suggested that exposure to radioactive particles was cumulative over a lifetime, health physicists 
struggled to develop safety guidelines in the same way that they had developed regulations for 
radiation itself. Exposure to radioactive particles was an inherently random risk. Certain particles 
that might normally cause very little harm in the air could rapidly damage human tissue once 
they were deposited in the lungs or gastrointestinal tract. As a result, environmental regulators 
were unable to independently determine safe levels of uranium and other radioactive particles in 
soils and streams. Instead, they depended upon the AEC to provide information and to help them 
to determine reasonable levels of pollution in the environment.13 
The legislation that established the AEC did nothing to address the problem. The Atomic 
Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954 gave the AEC wide and exclusive regulatory powers regarding 
atomic energy, materials, and facilities. The commissioners of the AEC reflected the language of 
the Acts by delegating a wide range of powers to local field offices. These field offices were 
given a large responsibility to develop waste and scrap disposal regulations to suit local 
situations. In particular, the field offices were allowed to negotiate with state-level regulators 
regarding pollution.14  
The various state authorities were completely unprepared to deal with the creation of the 
nuclear weapons production system. State boards of health that had spent the last 50 years 
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cooperating with paper mills to keep chlorate levels down suddenly found themselves across the 
negotiating table from the AEC inquiring about uranium. The nature of uranium pollution was 
different from that of the coke-ovens and coal-fires that the state boards of health had been 
tasked to deal with 50 years earlier. Uranium in water supplies was undetectable by naked human 
senses. In contrast, phenol pollution from coke ovens almost immediately made drinking water 
taste bad enough to be unpalatable. As a result, municipalities could quickly threaten lawsuits 
against polluters.15 Without this threat, the state boards of health had much less power against 
other polluters. Indeed, the Ohio State Board of Health preferred a cooperative approach to 
pollution control until the end of the 1960s.16 Because of Cold War tensions, the AEC considered 
itself and its installations to be critical defense infrastructure in the middle of a war. Further, the 
vast powers of the Atomic Energy Act gave the AEC virtual immunity from litigation and a 
monopoly on atomic secrets. As a result, the state boards of health were unknowledgeable about 
the unique pollutants from AEC facilities and unsure about how to enforce agreed-upon 
regulations. In the absence of any clear evidence which suggested a public health issue, or any 
strong complaints regarding private property damage, there was little that the Ohio State Board 
of Health could enforce regarding radioactive pollution at Fernald.17 
The Cold War mentality further complicated matters. Uranium refineries were almost 
entirely dedicated to nuclear weapons production until the mid-1960s. As a result, these facilities 
were considered to be essential to the national security of the United States. Lacking an effective 
defense against Soviet nuclear weapons, the United States relied on the strategy of deterrence. 
Symbolized by Eisenhower’s New Look, the national security strategy of the United States was 
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directly tied to the number of nuclear weapons it possessed. By building a very large nuclear 
stockpile, the United States hoped to deter the Soviet Union from attacking. Given the American 
reliance on this strategy, the uranium production system was inherently a military system, and 
production was viewed through a wartime lens, even if there was no official war being fought. 
Radioactive pollution was viewed as a necessary negative effect of this conflict, something that 
could be tolerated so long as it resulted in eventual victory. It was through this lens that 
engineers and managers interpreted information. Fernald’s operators fully understood what the 
groundwater reports were saying. The reports argued that groundwater contamination would 
eventually present a public health problem. 
Nevertheless, this attitude became increasingly harmful as larger and larger shipments of 
uranium were sent to Fernald. As the 1950s wore on, more uranium mines opened in North 
America. By the end of 1957, the AEC contracts with Canadian uranium companies alone were 
worth $1.4 billion.18 The rapidly increasing shipments of uranium were sent to the AEC’s 
uranium refineries which were designed at a time that the United States was importing a fraction 
of the uranium. The result was a surplus of uranium rather than the shortage of a decade earlier. 
The AEC’s refineries found themselves working around the clock on tight production schedules. 
In addition, they were tasked with eliminating the surplus of uranium scrap and residues left over 
from earlier uranium production. The result of this expanded production was an increase in the 
amount of uranium leaving the Fernald plant and entering the surrounding environment. 
Significantly, losses of uranium via the storm sewer system at Fernald approximately doubled 
from 2600 pounds in 1957 to 5400 pounds in 1958.19 They doubled again from 1959 to 1960, 
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growing from 6300 pounds to 11,200 pounds. The next year, 2600 pounds of uranium were lost 
through Paddy’s Run, a small creek that formed the western boundary of the plant.20 
While pressure to produce uranium built at Fernald, the Cold War showed no signs of 
thawing. On 10 November 1958, the Premier of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, delivered 
a speech that was widely interpreted in the West as an ultimatum for the United States to leave 
West Berlin. Four months later, Eisenhower responded with an address of his own, accusing the 
Soviet Union of having manufactured a crisis in Berlin: 
Today’s Berlin difficulty is not the first stumbling block that international 
communism has placed along the road to peace. The world has enjoyed little relief 
from tensions in the past dozen years. As long as the communist empire continues 
to seek world domination, we shall have to face threats to the peace of varying 
character and location. We have lived and will continue to live in a period where 
emergencies manufactured by the Soviets follow one another like beads on a 
string.21 
While Eisenhower and Khrushchev agreed to negotiations within months of this address, 
Eisenhower’s choice of language and view of history remain striking in this context. The 
president implied that Cold War tensions and emergencies were not going to cease based on U.S. 
actions. Armed with a long list of communist “victories” since 1949, Eisenhower and other 
American leaders remained steadfast in their commitment to the twin policies of containment 
and nuclear arms production. 
In 1959, production at Fernald was quite steady. Out of a predicted schedule of 10,315 
tons of uranium, Fernald received more than expected: 11,505 tons.22 Broken down between the 
individual months, September received the lowest delivery of ore at 784 tons, while July was the 
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busiest month with 1320 tons of uranium ore delivered. According to NLO, the abnormally high 
receipts in July were the result of Canadian producers. In the July 1959 monthly report, the plant 
manager of Fernald, J.H. Noyes, suspected that Canadian uranium mills had waited until the 
beginning of the new the fiscal year to make large shipments to Fernald. Noyes went on to argue 
that the increased availability of Canadian ores “…provided an opportunity for better blending of 
the marginal feeds throughout the month.” 23 Evidently, uranium concentrates from different 
mines had different chemical properties and the operators at Fernald preferred certain batches of 
uranium over others. On July 31, C.L. Karl reported to his superior at Oak Ridge that “Canadian 
feed materials continue in good supply and the Sampling Plant is operating at near record level 
[sic] for sampling and weighing for the month.”24 In the month of August that year, concentrates 
from Colorado made up only 16.7 percent of the feed blend at Fernald. Further reports in August 
argued that Canadian uranium improved the performance of the refinery, and that tests were 
being conducted on a blend of twelve parts Canadian uranium to one part Portuguese uranium. 
Operators at Fernald were thus aware of where uranium ores were being delivered from and 
separated the uranium accordingly.  
Unpredictable delivery schedules, and the chemical differences in uranium ores led the 
operators at Fernald to blend different samples of uranium. This situation created the need for the 
storage and warehousing of uranium, one of the main routes by which uranium entered the 
surrounding environment. Uranium ores packaged into metal drums at Fernald were stockpiled 
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in the open air before being accepted for processing. Precipitation quickly corroded metal drums, 
and the uranium contents were then free to pollute the soil and groundwater.25 
Just as uranium arrived at Fernald from many locations, Fernald’s uranium products were 
also widely distributed. Refined uranium from Fernald fueled production at the AEC’s massive 
gaseous diffusion plants, as well as their sprawling plutonium production facilities. On average 
in 1959, Fernald produced 1,000 tons of uranium contained in uranium trioxide (UO3) per 
month. Of this, roughly 200 tons were sent to gaseous diffusion plants for enrichment. That same 
year, an average of 815 tons of uranium per month were reduced to metal for plutonium 
production. Once uranium compounds had been reduced to metal, they were machined and rolled 
into “slugs” for use in plutonium production reactors. To further complicate the variety of 
products Fernald produced, the different facilities at Hanford and Savannah River required 
different sized slugs, each with multiple designs. Hanford’s eight reactors consumed over 6,000 
tons of uranium slugs in 1959, while Savannah River’s five reactors received 1,770 tons that 
same year. In addition to the regular production shipments, Fernald prepared uranium products to 
order for the AEC’s research reactors and various private industries. However, these orders were 
not remotely close to the quantities needed for nuclear weapons production.26  
Like most other chemical plants and refineries, Fernald required large amounts of 
reactants to successfully run the chemical reactions that were necessary to refine uranium. Since 
pure uranium was the desired product, much of these chemicals were waste products. For 
example, the reduction reaction with magnesium to produce uranium metal also produced 
magnesium fluoride (MgF2). Contaminants in the form of wastewater and by-products from 
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uranium refining were stored in clay-lined storage pits before being pumped directly into the 
Great Miami River, roughly 3.5 kilometers south of Fernald. By 1962, the largest of these pits 
was 7.5 acres and contained nearly 50 million gallons of waste. That same year, some 800,000 
gallons of effluent were pumped into the pit each day, with a similar amount being released into 
the river. While the engineers at Fernald had taken the precaution of lining the waste pits with 
clay, a 1962 groundwater report found that it was likely that the clay liner had eroded in some 
areas, and that it was “probable” that tens of thousands of gallons of waste could leak from the 
pits without being detected.27  
The weekly reports also reveal that Fernald was just barely able to keep up with scrap 
production. The production of scrap materials was a problem that plagued the AEC and 
Manhattan Project since its inception. Improperly stored uranium materials quickly contaminated 
surrounding soil and water. By the mid-1950s, the uranium supply had improved to such an 
extent that local AEC offices were beginning to permanently dispose of scrap materials by 
burying them in landfills or at sea. At Fernald, the proposed solution was instead to operate a 
scrap recovery plant which would allow the most useful scrap materials from across the United 
States to be recycled back into the production stream. By 1958, AEC officials were searching for 
additional long-term plans to deal with scrap production.28 The scrap recovery plant at Fernald 
had operated since 1953, the only plant at Fernald allowed to operate more than five days a week 
by 1959.29 Still, the 1959 records clearly show that the Fernald scrap recovery plant struggled to 
reduce scrap inventories. On June 4, 1958, the Director of the Feed Materials Division of the 
                                                          
27 Andrew M. Spieker and Stanley E. Norris, “Ground-Water Movement and Contamination at the AEC Feed 
Materials Production Center Located Near Fernald, Ohio,” September 1962, Box 4, Series 27, Record Group 326, 
NARA, Atlanta. 14. 
28 John W. Ruch to R.C. Armstrong, “Interim Plan for the Management of Recycle Uranium Containing Materials,” 
June 4, 1958, Box 8, Series 27, Record Group 326, NARA, Atlanta. 





AEC, John Ruch, directed the assistant manager of the Oak Ridge Operations Office to 
implement an interim scrap recycle policy. In particular, Ruch argued that the scrap plant at 
Fernald should be operated at full capacity and with the “richest” scrap inventory.30 Evidently, 
the scrap plant’s primary function was to recover uranium while reduction of scrap inventory 
was a secondary consideration. This shows how environmental protection at AEC facilities was 
often a side effect of other programs. While the reduction in scrap inventories would have 
certainly reduced the amount of uranium pollution at Fernald, the primary goal was to recover 
the uranium content for nuclear weapons. 
It is not surprising that AEC administrators prioritized uranium production, especially 
considering the worsening Cold War tensions between 1959 and 1961. Fidel Castro and his 26th 
of July Movement successfully ousted the government of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba on January 
1, 1959. While relations between the United States and Castro’s government were originally 
cordial, they soon soured as the new Cuban government began a series of social and economic 
reforms, often to the detriment of American business interests. Throughout 1959, Eisenhower 
and Khrushchev held a series of meetings which had the potential to reduce tensions and end the 
on-going Berlin Crisis. However, on May 1, 1960, an American U-2 spy plane was shot down 
over the Soviet Union. Since the pilot survived, and the airframe was mainly intact, Khrushchev 
used the incident to publicly embarrass Eisenhower who had previously denied that such flights 
were occurring. As a result of the political fallout, the Four Powers summit in Paris, which had 
been scheduled for the middle of May 1960, fell apart after just two days of meetings.31 
Relations between the US and USSR deteriorated in the second half of 1960 and the Berlin Crisis 
remained unsolved. Communist anxiety in the United States was strong and John F. Kennedy 
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won the presidential election that fall, in part because of his perceived willingness to close the 
alleged “missile gap” between the Soviet Union and United States.32 Despite the intense anti-
communist rhetoric of the presidential campaign, Khrushchev recognized an opportunity with the 
arrival of a new American administration. The two leaders agreed to a meeting in Vienna in June 
1961.33 
Meanwhile, the AEC was concerned with two major items during this time. First, the 
uranium contracts that were due to be renewed in 1959 and second, groundwater pollution at 
Fernald. As early as 1956, officials in the Canadian government recognized that American 
stockpiles of uranium were growing, and that the AEC was unlikely to continue purchasing as 
much uranium as the Canadians could produce.34 By July 1958, the American uranium market 
was actively shrinking, and Eldorado had some difficulty holding the AEC accountable to their 
previous commitments. In November 1959, the AEC delivered the news to Eldorado: it would 
not be renewing its contracts past 1963.35 Upon reviewing the AEC documents, it is not hard to 
imagine why. Even though records from Fernald imply that operators preferred using Canadian 
uranium, Fernald could only refine roughly 10,000 tons of uranium per year. Even if we include 
Fernald’s sister plant, Weldon Spring, and assume that it could produce a similar amount, the 
AEC still purchased over 33,000 tons of uranium in 1959.36 Moreover, the AEC struggled to find 
storage space for feed materials, which contaminated the surrounding environment due to poor 
storage. An ever-increasing surplus of uranium concentrate only compounded this problem. 
Despite rising Cold War tensions, the AEC decided that by 1959 the surplus of uranium could 
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adequately ensure nuclear weapons production. The large industrial uses of uranium predicted in 
the earlier part of the decade had failed to materialize and the vast majority of uranium 
production would continue to be earmarked for bomb manufacturing.37 
At the same time as AEC officials in Washington decided to limit uranium imports, 
Fernald operators started to become more interested in groundwater contamination. Groundwater 
studies had been conducted at Fernald since at least 1951. In 1955, a staff scientist with the 
United States Department of the Interior, C.V. Theis, visited Fernald and inspected its waste 
disposal infrastructure. In his official report to the Division of Reactor Development with the 
AEC, Theis identified two major issues that could cause groundwater contamination: the pipeline 
which transported wastes into the disposal pits, as well as the pits themselves. In addition to 
these problems, Theis outlined the infrastructure that was already in place to prevent 
contamination: the concrete pad, the storm sewer system, and the lift station which transferred 
waste water into the Miami River when Paddy’s Run was dry. At the conclusion of his report, 
Theis remained cautious about disposing wastes directly into the soil at Fernald. He warned that 
Fernald’s relatively small size and proximity to other industrial and residential groundwater 
customers meant that the movement of groundwater contaminants in the future was 
unpredictable.38  
Despite the range of environmental protection technology that Theis described, industrial 
waste contaminated the aquifer under Fernald. In November 1961, groundwater from a test well 
at Fernald was revealed to contain heightened levels of pollutants. In order to find the source of 
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the contamination, NLO officials tried various methods, including the dumping of a radioactive 
marker into the waste pits to see if it would turn up later in groundwater tests. Despite NLO’s 
efforts, they were unable to determine the source, and requested the support of the AEC and U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGC).39  
By September 1962, the USGC completed their contamination study at Fernald. 
According to the report, the AEC contacted the USGS to “…ascertain whether seepage from four 
large waste disposal pits located near the west edge of the plant production area has entered the 
principal aquifer from which water is supplied to the AEC plant and to many other ground water 
users in the area.”40 Evidently, the administration of the AEC was less concerned with 
environmental damage in general, and more concerned with the pollution of economically 
valuable water sources. At the time, Fernald was drawing over 1 million gallons of water a day 
from the aquifer to produce uranium. This worry is reflected in the findings of the USGS report 
and the language of the internal NLO narrative. The authors of the USGS report argued that it 
would take ground water approximately 2 to 5 years to travel from the waste pits to the main 
plant supply wells, and 25 to 30 years to reach the town of New Baltimore and the Miami 
River.41 In the NLO narrative, Fernald was already regularly dumping waste directly into the 
river with a reading of 10,000 parts per million (ppm) of chlorides and 12,000 ppm of nitrates.42 
Rather than worry about directly polluting the river, NLO was worried about polluting the 
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economically important groundwater. The USGS recommended that NLO should dig more test 
wells, and that they should repair the bottom of the waste pits to better contain contaminants.43 
At the end of September 1962, the NLO Ground Contamination Study Committee 
released their report. This report summarized the contamination problems that Fernald had faced 
since the beginning of operations. In this report, officials from NLO argued that some of the 
assumptions made in the original design of Fernald were quickly proven false when Paddy’s Run 
was frequently found to be contaminated by waste. At the same time, the report highlights the 
efforts that NLO had taken to remedy the contamination problem. According to the report, NLO 
had spent over $1,000,000 and conducted at least six groundwater surveys since the beginning of 
operations. Beyond this, the committee recommended several solutions for the contamination 
problem, but few of them dealt with infrastructure. Interestingly, the committee recommended a 
change in philosophy: “The philosophy concerning ground contamination and plant cleanliness 
must be firmly restated and enforced throughout the project.”44 In perhaps a more practical 
direction, the committee also recommended that the “organizational responsibility for the control 
of ground contamination should be defined,” to which someone had written in the margins “after 
10 years still no definite responsibility.”45 Two pages later, the committee summarized their 
findings with an underlined statement: 
It is therefore concluded by this committee that the recommended capital 
improvements, along with increased awareness of the problem and efforts by all 
concerned, will eliminate or minimize undesirable contamination in Paddy’s Run, 
the ground water, and the Miami River.46 
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At the top of the same page, someone had written in pencil: “No!! White-wash. No teeth.”47 
These two statements capture the tension that existed in AEC installations during the Cold War. 
On the one hand, the pressure to produce uranium, and the understanding that this was a critical 
military defense mission to support the national American deterrent strategy, was immense. On 
the other, Fernald, like any other industrial polluter, wanted to avoid conflicting with the law by 
polluting economically important bodies of water. Yet in an era of weak-to-nonexistent 
environmental protection, NLO was left to regulate itself. The groundwater committee report 
clearly highlights how the lack of regulation resulted in mediocre attempts at environmental 
regulation as NLO and AEC officials watched pollution levels rise and did little to stop a slow 
motion environmental and health disaster. 
 In October 1962, the world watched the Cuban Missile Crisis unfold. In a dramatic 
display of Cold War tensions, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. confronted each other over the Soviet 
deployment of nuclear weapons on the island of Cuba. By this time, the American nuclear 
arsenal was immense and contained a stunning array of different weapon systems. In 1962, the 
United States maintained a significant strategic nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union. At the 
time, the U.S. was capable of deploying some 25,000 nuclear weapons from aircraft, naval ships, 
submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and artillery systems.48 The Soviet Union, on the 
other hand, possessed less than 3,500 warheads during the crisis.49 Frantic production at Fernald 
and other sites throughout the nuclear production system helped to resolve the Cuban Missile 
Crisis by ensuring an overwhelming strategic advantage in the favour of the United States. 
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While the US nuclear arsenal continued to expand after the peaceful resolution of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, rampant environmental pollution at Fernald did not become public 
knowledge for another twenty years. Six years before an explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear 
power plant broke international headlines, residents in Ohio were dealing with their own 
radioactive clouds.50 In January 1980, Citizens against a Radioactive Environment (CARE) 
announced that Paddy’s Run, the stream that ran beside Fernald, contained over twice the legal 
limit for radiation in public drinking water. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) fired 
back, arguing that CARE was applying the wrong standards for radiation limits. Richard 
Heatherton, by then the director for health and safety at Fernald, said that CARE’s application of 
the EPA’s limits was probably correct, although the radiation level of the stream fluctuated 
throughout the year. This is consistent with archival records, which show varying levels of 
uranium contamination throughout the calendar year. Through a Freedom of Information 
Request, CARE was able to access similar documents that showed that “equipment failures, 
routine leaks, and carelessness” allowed Fernald to discharge thousands of pounds of uranium 
into the environment.51 
CARE’s whistleblowing received little public attention until 11 December 1984, when 
local residents received the first confirmation from NLO and the Department of Energy, which 
succeeded the AEC in 1977, that uranium was escaping from the plant itself. The front page of 
the Cincinnati Enquirer warned residents that NLO was checking for a “possible” uranium 
leak.52 Within weeks, concerned residents began to organize themselves into groups. On January 
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11, 1985, 200 people attended a meeting convened by Fernald Residents for Environmental 
Safety and Health (FRESH).53 Working as a grassroots organization, FRESH engaged with 
government representatives and the EPA to try to raise awareness regarding pollution at Fernald. 
At the same time, American national newspapers began to sound the alarm about uranium 
contamination at Fernald. Headlines from major national newspapers like “Uncle Sam’s Hot 
Spot” and “Leaks of Uranium Dust an Ohio Issue” kept Fernald in the national spotlight 
throughout 1985.54 By August, the DOE confirmed that Fernald had contaminated local drinking 
wells.55  
Local resident Lisa Crawford replaced Kathy Meyer as FRESH president in late 1985 and 
spent the next several years meeting with Fernald officials, attending and organizing meetings, 
and travelling to Washington D.C. to testify in front of senate subcommittees. She remembers 
the day that Fernald stopped production as a day of celebration: “we actually went to one of the 
FRESH member’s houses and cracked open a bottle of champagne and said, ‘we won.’”56 
In March 1985, the Environmental Protection Agency had presented a notice of 
noncompliance to the Department of Energy related to the environmental contamination at the 
Fernald site. The following year, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency sued National Lead 
of Ohio and the DOE for violations of water pollution and hazardous waste laws. In response, the 
DOE invoked the Comprehensive Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), better 
known as the “Superfund” Act.57 As a DOE report explains, the Superfund process was used “to 
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characterize the nature and extent of contamination at the [Fernald] site…establish risk based 
clean-up standards, and select the appropriate remediation technologies to achieve those 
standards.”58 Having mismanaged the levels of pollution at Fernald for 30 years, the DOE was 
passing the responsibility directly on to the EPA and the American people.  
 By 1989, the final year of uranium production at Fernald, the amount of contamination 
was staggering. In 1990, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported that through Fernald’s 
refining activities, 470,000 kilograms of uranium dust and 160,000 curies of radon-222 were 
released into the atmosphere, and 90,000 kilograms of uranium were released into the surface 
water.59 In a separate study completed eight years later, the CDC further concluded that the 
pollution released by Fernald increased local residents’ lung cancer risk by 1 to 12 percent. 
Among the 43,000 to 50,000 people who had resided within ten kilometers of Fernald between 
1952 and 1988, the CDC estimated that anywhere from 25 to 309 excess lung cancer deaths 
would occur as a direct result of pollution from Fernald.60 In 1997, the Department of Energy 
reported that the Fernald site contained 490,000 cubic meters of low-level waste, and had 
polluted 2,100,000 cubic meters of solid media61 and 270,000 cubic meters of water. 62 
These numbers came as a shock to residents since contamination was not previously a 
matter of public record. Joe Wessels remembers that in his childhood he believed the Fernald 
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plant produced dog food because of its neutral logo and name.63 Many residents repeated 
similar stories in their interviews with the Fernald Community Alliance. As Sue Verkamp 
explained: 
But we all thought that it was a Purina Dog Food Plant because, you know, of the 
checkerboard. Everyone just assumed that they were making feed materials, they were 
making feed materials for animals. Just thought, well, the parent company must be 
Purina. And figured that it’s in farm country, so it’s probably horse feed and cow feed. 
That’s what I thought it was; that’s what my husband thought it was. And it wasn’t until 
we got more involved in finding out about it that we learned that no, it was actually 
feed materials for weaponry.64 
In response to the jolting headlines, residents living near the Fernald plant had launched their 
first lawsuit against National Lead of Ohio in 1985. Arguing that since radioactive emissions had 
not been public record prior to 1984, the plaintiffs sued for emotional distress and loss of 
property value. In 1989, the plaintiffs settled for $78 million split into three portions: cash 
payments for emotional distress, payments for loss of property value, and a trust fund established 
to support a medical monitoring program. The next year, Fernald workers organized and filed 
their own lawsuit for emotional distress related to the increased risk of cancer and won $20 
million in 1994.65 
In December 1990, nearly 10,000 people residing near Fernald began participating in the 
medical monitoring program established through their lawsuit. The monitoring program 
consisted of biannual medical check-ups provided free-of-charge to anyone deemed eligible. In 
an article published in 2009 by the doctors who administered the program, the authors stressed 
that it was comprehensive. The medical doctors performed a complete physical and checked for 
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any type of illness independent of its potential link to uranium exposure. According to the 
authors, this was in order to fulfil the “emotional distress” portion of the lawsuit. By the time the 
medical program was completed in 2008, doctors had diagnosed nearly 1700 “major” conditions 
in the original group of 10,000 residents, including diabetes, various forms of cancer, and 
chronic lung disease. Despite these diagnoses, the administrators of the program contended that, 
as a whole, the participants had a lower mortality rate than would be expected of the general 
population. The doctors also argued that participation in the program led to advanced detection 
of illness as well as an increased awareness of good health practices for the participants.66 
In 1997, the Fernald Community Alliance began the Fernald Living History Project 
(FLHP). By conducting over 130 interviews with residents, workers, activists, and management 
at Fernald, the Fernald Community Alliance sought to preserve the history of Fernald without 
relying on documentary evidence. During his interview, Stan Chesley, a lawyer for the citizen’s 
lawsuit, explained that National Lead of Ohio had been granted immunity from prosecution as a 
condition of their contract with the AEC,67 an important perspective from someone intimately 
connected with the Fernald story that is not evident in the archival material. Other interviews are 
filled with accounts regarding poor worker safety.68 In an interview in June 1999, Nancy Abbott 
spoke about her husband’s illness, and her struggle to obtain rightful compensation from 
Fernald’s management. Abbott’s husband worked at Fernald beginning in 1955. By 1982, he had 
passed away from cancer. Although the surgeon told Abbott that her husband’s cancer was 
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“without a doubt” connected to his work at Fernald, the management refused to award her any 
form of worker’s compensation.69  
Of course, the environmental and health data outlined in this chapter was not available to 
the residents and workers affected by Fernald until the late 1980s. Their anger and frustration 
was, and continues to be, justified. The secretive nature of nuclear weapons production ensured 
that workers and residents were not consulted by the AEC about health and environmental 
concerns related to Fernald and were instead kept in the dark. Cold War tensions in the 1950s 
and 1960s demanded high production from Fernald. But as production at Fernald increased as a 
result of large uranium supplies, the pollution of the environment increased as well. Residents 
and workers, assured that they were safe, continued to live and work in Fernald’s shadow. By the 
1980s, a wave of environmental activism, the waning of the Cold War, and intense media 
attention brought production at Fernald to an end. Although the last uranium left the plant in 



















                                                          







Beginning in the mid-1940s and continuing to the mid-1960s, the United States 
purchased mountains of uranium ore for its nuclear weapons program. While uranium had 
formerly been a waste product in the production of radium, the development of the atomic bomb 
transformed the demand for, and applications of, uranium. Expecting the need for nuclear 
weapons to counter a perceived Soviet threat, American administrators working for the newly 
formed Atomic Energy Commission sought to gain control of uranium supplies across the world. 
By stimulating the price of uranium with a purchasing program, uranium supplies quickly and 
drastically increased by the mid-1950s. Canada, in particular, greatly benefited from the demand 
created by nuclear weapons production. By the end of the 1950s, at the height of the Cold War, 
uranium was the most valuable Canadian export behind wood products and wheat.1 Within the 
United States, the AEC spent incredible amounts of public money to build the giant processing 
facilities required to transform the uranium into an atomic bomb. For a single piece of uranium 
to become part of a nuclear weapon, it needed to travel across the United States through several 
facilities. At each facility, scraps, waste, and extensive pollution were guaranteed by-products of 
uranium processing. Despite the fact that nuclear weapons production was organized on a federal 
level, waste policy and pollution control were not. Contractors at each AEC facility were free to 
develop pollution policy according to local conditions. Cold War tensions and a lack of national 
environmental regulation resulted in effectively no regulation of the AEC. Consequently, 
pollution control was always a secondary concern to nuclear weapons production for the AEC 
during the Cold War. 
                                                          





Nevertheless, uranium scraps and residues were a concern for AEC administrators from 
the very beginning of the nuclear arms race. In an atmosphere of uranium scarcity and Cold War 
anxiety, war planners wanted to maximize uranium resources by maintaining scraps for potential 
use in the future. Yet sanitary engineers quickly understood that these residues were quite 
dangerous and easily leached into the surrounding soil and water. Due to a lack of strong 
regulations, however, the managers of AEC regional offices were free to deal with contamination 
problems as they saw fit. As a result, radioactive scraps were disposed of in various ways as the 
uranium supply improved. Buried in various landfills and waste pits, the residues were forgotten 
about. The rise of the environmentalist movement and the actions of the Environmental 
Protection Agency brought the uranium activities of the AEC, now operating as the Department 
of Energy, under intense public scrutiny. After 40 years of little to no outside regulation, the 
DOE suddenly found itself accountable to an angry and anxious public.  
In 1989, Congress ordered the Department of Energy (DOE) to cease uranium production 
at Fernald and begin preparation for environmental remediation. In 1992, the DOE awarded an 
environmental remediation contract to the Fluor Corporation. The plan was ambitious, estimated 
to cost $12 billion over 30 years. By 2006, Fluor had disposed of thousands of tons of 
radioactive waste and soil, as well as completed the demolition of all of Fernald’s original 
contaminated structures.2 Governmental and regulatory agencies hailed the cleanup of Fernald as 
a commercial and environmental success. If we only look at the surface, it is easy to see why. 
The project was completed under budget and on time. The Fernald site is now a beautiful green 
square with wetlands and walking trails. Local nature groups claim that the space is a sanctuary 
for wildlife, and the visitor’s center has won an award for green design by the U.S. Green 
                                                          





Building Council. Beneath the surface, however, there is less to celebrate. While Fluor was able 
to remove the waste pits and other contaminated media on site, they were unable to remove the 
uranium that had entered the water table. The underground plume of uranium continues to 
pollute the Great Miami River, but at levels that the DOE maintains are “safe”.3 As a result, the 
environmental legacy of Fernald is complicated. Without the history of mismanagement and 
pollution, the green space should be a celebrated accomplishment of the community. It is not 
wrong to say that the Fernald site is now a sanctuary for wildlife in an otherwise industrialized 
landscape. At the same time, the underground contamination has rendered the site “permanently 
uninhabitable” for humans. Uranium refining irreparably damaged the aquifer, and the trust of 
the community has been broken. 
 Elsewhere, a similar story played out at nuclear sites across the United States. In 1997, 
Congress ordered the Army Corps of Engineers to conduct a study into potentially contaminated 
sites dating back to the Manhattan Project. Launching a program known as the Former Utilized 
Sites Remediation Action Program (FUSRAP), the Corps is currently engaged with remediation 
at various sites which have been since abandoned and their radioactive legacy forgotten.4 In the 
post-Cold War era, the huge installations at Rocky Flats, Hanford, Oak Ridge, Portsmouth, 
Paducah, and Savannah River were closed down. Across the United States, the DOE spent 
billions of dollars in the 1990s and 2000s to remediate these Cold War relics, with mixed results. 
At Rocky Flats, for example, remediation was carried out in a similar manner to Fernald. The 
immediate area was decontaminated but is unfit for any residential or commercial enterprise. At 
Hanford, the most contaminated industrial site in the United States, the cleanup operation is not 
                                                          
3 “What’s In The Water? Local 12 Investigates Fernald," Local 12 WKRC, March 1, 2018, news broadcast accessed 
on YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TnIHWepc7do. 
4 Included in the FUSRAP program are many sites which I briefly mentioned in Chapter one such as Vitro, DuPont 





yet completed, even after 20 years of intense work. Across the nuclear weapons production 
system, environmental contamination, expensive remediation, medical studies, and lawsuits are 
the familiar story.  
In the present day, radioactive contamination is an ongoing legacy of the Cold War. 
Documentaries like Atomic Homefront and books like Plutopia remind us that contamination 
continues to harm people long after a bomb has been manufactured.5 Current environmental 
remediation and medical monitoring are costs of nuclear weapons production that war planners 
of the Cold War did not, and perhaps could not have, considered. Hundreds of millions of dollars 
in compensation rightfully paid out to workers and citizens is part of the nuclear legacy. At the 
same time, the United States and the Russian Federation each maintain approximately 1,600 
nuclear warheads armed and ready to fire at a moment’s notice.6  
During the Cold War, the uranium production system and its refineries were essential to 
the nuclear arms race and the testing that went along with it. While the United States had built 
only a handful of nuclear weapons by the end of the Second World War, the American weapons 
production system had manufactured over 28,000 warheads by the end of 1963.7 Yet, as the 
Fernald case study demonstrates, the production of nuclear weapons was a particularly damaging 
enterprise. Environments and communities were profoundly harmed by the industrial activities 
carried out across the United States in support of the production of nuclear weapons. The Cold 
War may have found a political resolution, but the environmental and health ramifications 
continue into the present.  
                                                          
5 “Atomic Homefront,” accessed July 13, 2018, https://www.atomichomefront.film/; Brown, Plutopia. 
6 “Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” 8 April 2010, 
Treaties and Other International Acts Series. Commonly known as “New START.” 





This thesis contributes to a more complete and nuanced understanding of the Cold War 
by highlighting the role that uranium refining played in the nuclear arms race as well as the 
environmental and health impacts of weapons manufacturing. Overshadowed by larger, more 
environmentally destructive AEC facilities, the Fernald plant has received scant attention by 
historians. Yet the story of Fernald is critically important to the wider historiography of the Cold 
War as well as the discipline of environmental history. This case study demonstrates how the 
AEC and its contractors consistently emphasized the production of nuclear weapons at the 
expense of environmental and biological harm caused by the refining of uranium during the Cold 
War. 
Though billions of dollars have been spent, and former industrial sites like Fernald are 
now green, people continue to suffer from illness and the threat of shortened lifespans because of 
nuclear weapons production. This is the inherent irony when scholars and the public engage with 
the threat of nuclear weapons. We spill oceans of ink writing about what could happen if nuclear 
war ever occurs. We rarely stop to think about the people who have suffered because of nuclear 
weapons manufacturing. We worry about what might happen if the missiles ever leave their 
silos. We decline to worry about what has already happened to workers and residents who are 
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